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ABSTRACT 
The eco-certification movement has gained significant momentum is some developing 
country industries, products, and markets, but the certification of wild-caught seafood 
production in developing country contexts is limited. In wild-capture fisheries, eco-
certification has been relatively limited in Africa since the growth of certification programs 
expanded rapidly in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Few African fisheries have attained 
certification to standards set by the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), the most 
prominent voluntary third-party certifier for wild-captured fisheries partly because 
certification to the MSC requires relatively significant resources and capacity. In response, 
proponents of eco-certification such as the World Wildlife Fund, the Sustainable Fisheries 
Partnership and the Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions, initiated and developed 
multi-stakeholder Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) in the 2010s to help fisheries make 
improvements and meet sustainability indicators. Few researchers have examined FIPs 
within an African context, however, and little is known about how FIPs have been 
implemented in the African context. Drawing on literature review and key informant 
interviews with stakeholders involved in FIPs in the African context, this research examines 
the motivation and role of different actors and organizations within FIPs and the 
interactions among these actors and organizations. The findings suggest that international 
actors play significant roles in FIPs in early African cases, with significant international 
efforts to support capacity-building including fisheries management capacity. Local 
governments are often portrayed by actors and organizations involved in FIPs as weak and 
lacking enthusiasm. Producers, such as small-scale fishers, are generally not meaningfully 
integrated into formal FIP processes. These findings suggest that FIPs are shaped by 
complex and contested political economies of transnational governance with power 
differences influencing the motivation and interaction of participants. The political 
economy of FIPs includes complex and challenging opportunities and barriers to inclusion 
and participation and a general ambiguity of social development questions. 
Keywords: Fishery Improvement Projects, Marine Stewardship Council, Africa, Actos’ 
Involvement, Gambia  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Wild-capture fisheries, or capture production as often referred to in many United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) documents, is a major source of income and 
livelihood for more than 38.5 million people and contributes 16.6% of the protein intake of 
these people (FAOSTAT, 2016). The dependency and ever-increasing demand for various 
fisheries products by humans for varying purposes have increased pressure on existing fish 
stocks. But these stocks, according to the FAO, have already been over-exploited by 30% 
(Selden et al., 2016). In this context, wild caught fisheries around the world have been 
challenged with declining fish stocks, depleting ecological and ecosystems, and poor 
management structures. This is caused in part by practices such as poor by-catch 
enforcement measures, overexploitation and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing activities amongst other issues (Kirby & Ward, 2014; Gianni & Simpson, 2005 in 
Agnew et al., 2009). Although there are challenges in understanding the state of the world’s 
fisheries, the FAO’s 2016 publication on the State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 
(FAO-SOFIA, 2016) indicates that wild-caught fisheries produced 93.4 million tonnes as 
of 2014 (FAOSTAT, 2016). Despite major challenges, wild caught fisheries continue to 
provide the basis for significant social development and food security outcomes worldwide.  
This thesis examines new governance interventions in wild capture fisheries, with a focus 
on the African context. Historically, most regulations on fishery management, like other 
natural resources, were led by the state  and their related agencies or departments who have 
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the sovereign power and authority over their fisheries, and in most cases, decisions were 
made from a more centralized system (Bush, Khiem & Sinh, 2009). The effectiveness of 
federal agencies and departments in resolving rising environmental challenges were 
increasingly questioned in the 1990s with the rise of neo-liberalism and associated crtiques 
of state-led management of resources (See Konefal, 2013). But, in recent decades, there 
has been the introduction of many diverse groups of actors and participants (e.g 
development donors, NGOs, community associations groups), all engaged and 
collaborating to a certain extent in the management of natural resources (See Ponte et al., 
2017). Eco-labeling, often verified through processes of third-party environmental 
certification, has been developed and promoted as a second-generation environmental 
policy tool to help address and ensure sustainable use and management of natural resources. 
Critics, however, still question its functionality and accountability in the management of 
resources (Kern, Jörgens, & Jänicke, 2001).  
Eco-labeling and related environmental certification programs emerged as response to both 
challenges in governmental management within the wild-capture fisheries sector and to the 
growing interest in market-oriented solutions. In particular, the Marine Stewardship 
Council (MSC) emerged in 1997 as a non-state actor championing sustainable fisheries 
through its environmental standard that fisheries can meet through an accredited third-party 
certification process (Foley, 2012; Ponte, 2012). Historical support for the emergence of 
the MSC could be traced right back to 1992 with the displacement of over 35, 000 fishers 
within more than 300 communities from the collapse of Canada’s Grand Banks or 
Newfoundland cod (See Bavington, 2011). This collapse helped motivate Unilever and 
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Worldwide Fund for Nature (also known as the World Wildlife Fund or WWF) to create 
the MSC in the late 1990s with the ambition and objective to boost conservation of wild-
caught fisheries around the world (Gulbrandsen, 2009).  To date, a total of 372 wild caught 
fisheries are engaged and participating in the MSC program: 259 are already certified and 
114 are undergoing  full assessment, accounting for approximately 12 percent of global 
globally caught wild-fisheries annually (NovaNewsNOW.COM, 2018). 
Recognizing the current trend towards sustainability, fisheries around the world are 
increasingly being encouraged by international market actors such as supermarkets, 
retailers, foodservice companies, and processors to verify sustainability practices through 
sustainability certification processes. Amongst several certification schemes, many in the 
wild-caught fisheries industry are promoting the MSC’s environmental certification as the 
‘gold standard’ with its independent and accredited third-party sustainability certification 
processes and accreditations (Hadjimichael & Hegland, 2016; Gulbrandsen, 2009). The 
sustainability label that the MSC provides to successfully certified fisheries has been 
analyzed as part of the more general global growth of market-oriented good environmental 
governance through eco-labeling of products, especially for natural resources within agri-
food systems and forestry (Auld, Gulbrandsen, & McDermott, 2008).  
In this context, eco-certification within fisheries is looked upon as a market-oriented 
regulatory policy instrument that encourages better fishing practices by, and in theory, 
creating various market benefits for those who receive certification, such as potential price 
premiums or market access. The expectation for proponents is that eco-certification will 
compensate those who incur extra production costs and who promote environmental 
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stewardship (Carlson & Palmer, 2016; Blomquist, Bartolino, & Waldo, 2015; Goyert et al., 
2010). To acquire an MSC label, the fishery must undergo third-party assessment focused 
on the MSC’s environmental standard for sustainable and well-managed fisheries, which 
includes three categories of broad principles and criteria involving maintenance of the fish 
stock health, ecosystem protection, and good and effective management structure 
(Bellchambers et al., 2016). But meeting these requirements have been very challenging 
for many fisheries, particularly those in developing nations with inadequate financial 
resources and capabilities in areas such as expertise and access to innovative technologies. 
The process to certification is also relatively costly and resource-intensive for many 
fisheries in developing countries, particularly small-scale, artisanal fisheries (Deirdre & 
Momo, 2016). 
Achieving MSC standards is quite challenging for many small-scale and developing 
country fisheries like many of those in Africa with little capabilities and capacities. In 
response, Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) have been developed by environmental 
NGOs and industry partners to help fisheries raise their standards and practices of 
sustainability to a level which can potentially enable the fishery to apply for a formal 
certification process (CASS, n.d; WWF-US, 2013). While many countries strive to seek 
alternative measures to address some of these issues and ensure the sustainability of their 
fisheries, many small-scale fisheries in developing counties still face unique challenges in 
attaining these standards (See Gutierrez et al., 2011; Worm et al., 2009). Some of the 
factors hindering the uptake of certification in the developing world context and motivating 
actors to pursue FIPs include the costs associated with the adoption of new fishing 
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technologies and practices, a lack of expertise and general capacity, complex bureaucratic 
procedures and a lack of environmental stewardship in the region (Gulbrandsen, 2010; 
Higman et al., 2002). Despite these challenges, there are indications of change in Africa 
and many fisheries are standing up to embrace improvement and certification initiatives for 
their fisheries. This thesis provides one of the first analyses of FIPs as a new environmental 
governance intervention within the African context. 
New governance interventions: Fishery Improvement Projects 
Responding to the challenge of improving the sustainability performance of fisheries to 
levels that might enable successful MSC certification, the WWF, the Sustainable Fishery 
Partnership (SFP), and the Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions (CASS), amongst 
other actors, are promoting Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) with specific guidelines 
to help improve fisheries’ activities. These guidelines include the participation of multiple 
stakeholders working towards the shared goal of meeting sustainability standards, with the 
MSC standards as the benchmark (WWF-US, 2013).   
There have been several definitions by various organizations as to what a FIP is.  According 
to the Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions (n.d),  
“a Fishery Improvement Project (FIP) is a multi-stakeholder effort to address 
environmental challenges in a fishery. These projects utilize the power of the 
private sector to incentivize positive changes towards sustainability in the 
fishery and seek to make these changes endure through policy change” (p.6).  
FIPs are designed to generally involve, directly and indirectly, key stakeholders, such as 
seafood producing organizations and retailers, supporting NGOs and partners, corporations 
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and, where possible, funders working together on a common action plan to improve fishing 
activities within a specific fishery. Principal requirements such as transparency, dedicated 
funding, and rigorous scientific assessments all go a long way to justify the objectives and 
successes of a FIP (CASS, n.d).   
In an attempt to meet the competitive nature of the market for sustainable fisheries products, 
many fisheries, especially small-scale fisheries in the developing country contexts that are 
widely considered unable to currently meet the MSC’s environmental standards for 
sustainable and well-managed fisheries, are engaged in FIP initiatives to meet standards set 
by the MSC (See Bush & Oosterveer, 2015). FIPs have therefore emerged as a new 
institutional, collaborative and multi-stakeholder governance initiative in the broader trend 
of growing private or non-state governance of international seafood production and trade. 
FIPs are designed to encourage the participation of actors from the state and private sector 
amongst other relevant stakeholders to help improve the fishery in question towards 
sustainability and possibly standards set to the MSC. A range of fisheries in Africa are 
currently engaging in FIPs to make their fishery sustainable and to possibly achieve the 
opportunity to use the MSC label (MSC, 2013a), but we know little about how these FIPs 
have emerged and evolved and who is involved in the various FIPs. This thesis, therefore, 
seeks to enhance our understanding of these understudied new governance interventions 
within the African context.  
1.2 Purpose of the Research 
This thesis seeks to develop one of the first studies on the implementation of FIPs initiatives 
within the African context. As of writing, there exists on-going FIPs  located in The 
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Gambia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar, Morocco, and South Africa (See 
FISHERYPROGRESS.ORG, 2018; MSC, 2013b). Given that these initiatives are new in 
the region, there is very little research exploring and examining how these FIPs were 
developed or initiated, which actors are involved and why they are engaged in these FIPs, 
what roles various actors play, the challenges and barriers that fisheries face in 
implementing FIPs, the level of collaboration and power issues in terms of decision-
making, and the significance of MSC certification in the process. More broadly, although 
FIPs guidelines encourage the involvement of multiple stakeholders, the motivations, roles, 
responsibilities, and influence of multiple actors in terms of decision-making, policy 
development, and implementation have received little scholarly attention. This research 
seeks to conduct an in-depth analysis as to the motivations, roles, and involvement of 
multiple actors (e.g. fishers groups and organizations) within FIPs within the African 
context. It primarily seeks to identify the key actors within each fishery and also identify 
the actors’ motivation for involvement and their roles and responsibilities in FIPs. It also 
seeks to identify whether and how their presence and activities are specifically oriented 
towards assisting the fishery to be both ecologically sustainable and socially beneficial to 
fishers, both economically and in addressing food security issues. 
1.3 Research Questions and Thesis Statement 
This research focuses on an empirical analysis of FIPs in Africa that have developed or are 
developing processes for the improvement of their fisheries. It assumes that the 
participation of several actors and agents in these FIPs will generally create variations in 
the governance system of the fisheries. To determine the motivations, roles, 
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responsibilities, and influence of various stakeholders’ in FIPs, the analysis was organized 
around questions about the roles of various stakeholders in decision-making, policy 
development and implementation and capacity building in FIP processes. In doing this, two 
overall research questions guided this study: 
(1) What are FIPs and how can we understand the development and growth of FIPs 
internationally, particularly in developing country contexts? 
(2) How can we understand and explain the implementation of FIPs in the African 
context?  
a. Who are the actors involved in FIPs in the African context?  
b. What is the motivation for actor involvement and what are their objectives? 
c. What are their various roles in terms of decision-making and participation 
in the FIP? 
d. To what extent are the various actors influencing the FIP processes? 
e. What are the constraints and opportunities in ensuring fishers are involved 
in decision making and influence the outcomes in terms of costs and 
benefits? 
The study results support the following thesis statement: The advancement and 
proliferation of FIPs through a multi-stakeholder, interactive engagement approach has 
created a pragmatic shift in governance to a more international scale involving complex 
and challenging opportunities and barriers to inclusion and participation, with weak 
participation by governments, and a general ambiguity of social development questions. 
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1.4 Justification of the Study 
The MSC stands as the principal international voluntary third-party standard-setter for 
wild-caught fisheries certification around the world. It is organized around three principal 
standards for a sustainable fishery namely, sustainable fish stocks, minimal environmental 
impact, and effective management (MSC, 2013). Meeting these standards has been very 
challenging for many fisheries in the world, especially those in Africa with very limited 
financial, human resource and management capacity. The initiation and implementation of 
a FIP by any specific fishery aims at improving the fishery so that it can meet the standards 
set by the MSC, although there are often significant challenges to improve governance or 
management systems of fisheries towards meeting the demands of the standards. 
Understanding who is involved in FIPs and how they are collaborating to overcome 
challenges within FIPs will potentially provide new practical knowledge for improving 
improvement-oriented practices.  
This research is therefore relevant in that it improves our understanding as to how 
collaborative and interactive efforts in the African context are seeking to overcome some 
of the challenges and fostering fishery sustainability and certification in the region through 
FIPs. Understanding this process will potentially improve our understanding of the 
potential and limitations of FIPs and FIP-related interactions in overcoming sustainability 
challenges. The findings from the research will add to existing scholarship on FIPs in the 
developing country context and provide one of the first analyses of FIPs in the African 
context. 
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1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1: Scope of the Study 
This research focuses on Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) in Africa in general, though 
with specific interest on those whose information could be traced on the fisheryprogress.org 
website and other available literature from related documents in the region that cites a 
fishery as being a FIP or participating in a FIP process. There are different types of FIPs in 
Africa (See table 4) and in different countries, with varying types of actors and agents’ 
involvement in these FIP policy processes and activities (FISHERYPROGRESS.ORG, 
2018; MSC, 2013b; CapFish, 2012). This thesis seeks to improve our understanding of 
these actors, their involvement, and their interactions. 
1.6.1.1 The Gambia Sole Fishery Case Study 
The Gambia Sole fishery is an important case study for this research owing to its full 
engagement in FIP related activities that qualifies it as a Comprehensive FIP, which the 
Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions defines using a set of guidelines. As a 
Comprehensive FIP, participating actors are engaged in assisting the fishery address its 
environmental constraints and in meeting the MSC set standards. Through multiple actors 
and stakeholders’ engagement and support (both technical and financial), the fishery has 
undergone two consecutive MSC pre-assessments though was not able to pass or meet all 
the standards set by the MSC (Keus, Medley & Sieben, 2015; DeAlteris, Cessay & Jallow, 
2012).   
The principal objective of the Gambian Sole fishery FIP is to identify gaps and implement 
recommendations from their Marine Stewardship Council 2015 pre-assessment report of 
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the fishery while observing guidelines of a Comprehensive FIP set by the Conservation 
Alliance for Seafood Solutions. With a timeline up to 2022, the FIP seeks to address most 
of the gaps and issues identified by the MSC 2015 pre-assessment and to address it 
following the three principles of the MSC (See section 2.2.2), with a defined work plan and 
set of activities (fisheryprogress.org, 2018). Based on preliminary research,  a diverse group 
of actors appeared to be involved in the FIP and thus this case provides an opportunity to 
examine the specific roles and activities of various groups in FIP processes in the African 
context.  
1.6.2 Data Sources 
1.6.2.1: Literature Review 
Relevant secondary data were located through literature searches, reviews and studies on 
FIPs from both global and Africa-focused publications, gazettes or Newsfeeds on fishery 
governance and peer-reviewed journal articles through online searches from the MUN 
databases and Google. It involved a desk-top, web-based internet search of relevant 
publications or articles using key searches with phrases such as “Fishery certification and 
fishery projects in Africa,” “Fishery Improvement Projects,” “the Marine Stewardship 
Council and Africa,” “Gambia fishery certification.” These searches were completeed 
through the Memorial University of Newfoundland (MUN) libraries, which has access to 
databases such as Scopus and ProQuest and through Google Scholar. The documents 
retrieved through this process were read and categorized to develop a preliminary 
understanding of FIPs in general and who was involved in each FIP and certification 
process in the African context specifically, including an identification of information that 
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might indicate their roles and responsibilities in the process, their objectives, challenges, 
and constraints. Another important source of literature for the review was from peer-
reviewed literature in journals or articles from Elsevier publication house. Also, grey 
literature from sources such as conference papers/presentations, important reports from the 
MSC organization website, the WWF’s website, the African Union – Interafrican Bureau 
for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR), NEPAD, and foreign sponsors project reports (for 
example USAID Ba Nafaa project in The Gambia, UK’S DFID join NEPAD project in 
Kenya and Tanzania and fishery consultants reports) were all incorporated into the study. 
1.6.2.2: Key Informant Interviews 
Through scoping and literature reviews, the researcher was able to identify many FIP 
related actors in the African region and the Gambia from which relevant actors were 
identified. The researcher, therefore, decided to conduct key informant interviews by 
recruiting actors and/or experts engaged in FIP activities in the region, including 
participants within the Gambian Sole fishery’s FIP. These included representative/leaders 
of fishing groups, fishery clients, government department representatives, the MSC, WWF, 
industries (buyers and exporters). Participants were selected based on their position, role or 
involvement in the fishery and the related FIP activities. In-depth semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with the use of guided and semi-structured questions (Marshall 
& Rossman, 2014).  
Though potential participants were identified and contacted from various literature and 
online sources, the recruitment of participants also included a snowball sampling technique, 
specifically the exponential non-discriminative snowball sampling (Noy, 2008). With this 
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technique, the researcher identified contact information for other potential interviewees 
during interviews from initial participants. Several referrals for other persons were obtained 
and the chain continued until the target number of recruits agreeing to be interviewed was 
reached. In total, 16 individuals agreed to participate and were able to be interviewed for 
the research. Due to geographic, financial, and logistical constraints, the researcher was not 
able to travel to these countries and so decided to employ the use of Skype interviewing, 
and in some cases email correspondence, to carry out interviews with the consent of 
participants.  
Consent was obtained before every interview and all interviewees agreed to be audio 
recorded during the conversation. Recognising the time zone differences between the two 
regions, interviews were carried out at the discretion of the interviewee’s local time and 
location, and by whatever mode of communication they selected for the interview. In some 
situations, due to poor internet connections, the participant decided to participate through 
email exchanges where I sent him/her the questions and the person replied by same means. 
All the interviewees were initially contacted by email and several follow up emails were 
sent to them for reminders, especially those with very busy schedules. This research process 
was approved by the Grenfell Campus Research Ethics Board at the Memorial University 
of Newfoundland. 
The table below shows a breakdown of participating actors interviewed within the broader 
African context who are knowledgeable of FIP processes and activities in the region. It 
includes members from participating NGOs, consultants and other regional and 
international institutions in the region.  
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Table 1. List of participants interviewed from the broader African Context engaged in 
FIPs 
 African Union 
(AU-IBAR) 
Fishery Consultants International 
Organizations and 
NGOs Officials 
Number of 
respondents emailed 
 
7 
 
11 
 
23 
Number of failed 
emails 
 
0 
 
6 
 
9 
Number of 
respondents 
agreeing to 
participate 
 
3 
 
3 
 
5 
Total interviewed  
1 
 
3 
 
3 
Compiled by Author (2018) 
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The table below identifies interviewees linked to the Gambia Sole fishery. 
Table 2. List of actors group interviewed for the Gambia Sole Fishery’s FIP 
 Local 
Institutions1 
Industry Promoting 
institutions/Researchers 
WWF 
Number of 
respondents 
emailed 
 
14 
 
3 
 
3 
 
6 
Number of failed 
emails 
 
5 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
2 
Number of 
respondents 
agreeing to 
participate 
 
3 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
Total 
interviewed 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
1 
Compiled by Author (2018) 
1.6.3 Data Analysis 
All materials from the literature review and related sources were analyzed with the help of 
the Statistical software NVIVO 11 Student Pro. Key themes relating to actors’ roles, 
interactions, and involvement within the various FIP cases were coded in NVIVO and used 
in the analysis.  This was followed by critical content analysis of key issues which were 
                                                          
1 Local institutions here represent people from government departments and the NASCOM (co-
management committee for the Sole Fishery) 
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highlighted and coded into NVIVO 11 using themes/codes drawn from the various 
literature that explores collaboration and interactions or stakeholders’ involvement in the 
FIPs using the theoretical approach of political economy such as transnational actors, 
market actors, and power dynamics (see Chapter 3). The analysis focused on important 
themes that address the research questions and understanding of the overall background of 
FIPs and fishery certification in Africa with special attention on the general African context 
and Gambia Sole fishery FIP as a case study. 
Digital voice recordings of the interviews that were conducted over Skype were transcribed 
and coded for key themes in NVIVO 11. All interviews except those conducted by email 
exchanges were transcribed with the use of Express Scribe Transcription software at a 
transcription speed of 45% that could permit the researcher to properly do the transcription. 
All the transcripts were coded and saved in a password protected USB pen drive with access 
only to the researcher and his supervisory committee. The coded information from the 
interview was used to address key research questions which include:  
1) What is the motivation for stakeholder involvement and what objectives have they 
set for their participation?  
2) What are their various roles and responsibilities in terms of decision-making and 
participation in the fishery and FIP?  
3) To what extent are the various stakeholders involved in the FIP influencing the FIP 
process, particularly with respect to improving the fishery’s prospects towards 
attaining a sustainability status?  
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4) What are the constraints and challenges in ensuring stakeholders receive a fair 
opportunity to share in decision-making, costs, and benefits of their participation 
and interest in the FIP activities and/or initiatives?  
The coded transcripts in NVIVO 11 were analyzed using content analysis which recognizes 
meanings to make relevant inferences from the text (Stemler, 2001). Using the technique 
as noted by Ryan & Bernard (2003), codes and themes were identified from the responses 
in each interview. The creation of codes was directed by the questions guiding the research 
and by using the analytical insights of political economy (see Chapter 3) 
1.7 Ethics Consideration 
With the involvement of human participants for data collection through interviews, the 
research was subject to ethics approval at Memorial University. The researcher applied for 
and received an ethical approval from the Grenfell Campus Research Ethics Board (GC-
REB). The application included a recruitment letter that was sent out to participants and a 
letter of informed consent that informed the potential participants about the purpose of 
interviews and informed the potential participants that participation in the study is 
voluntary. 
1.8 Limitations of the study 
The literature of FIPs in developing countries, especially across Africa, has been growing 
very slowly. This shortcoming limited the availability of adequate scholarly literature and 
made it very difficult to have a broader comparative discussion on FIP governance issues 
through different perspectives and views in Africa. Also, carrying out such research with 
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the involvement of multiple actors/stakeholders from different countries is quite complex 
and recruitment is challenging in this context. Also due to resource constraints, the 
researcher could not visit these countries to conduct face-to-face interviews or even acquire 
a first-hand observation of their operations. As a result, the researcher selected an 
alternative method, using Skype to carry out interviews. Despite these limitations, the thesis 
makes an important contribution to an understudied type of new governance intervention 
(FIPs) in the African context. 
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CHAPTER TWO: FIPS AS NEW ENVIRONMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE  
This chapter explores and draws from the burgeoning literature on eco-certification 
schemes, particularly research on the Marine Stewardship Council, and other similar new 
environmental governance initiatives such as FIPs that have been prominent in current 
discourses on reforming and improving wild-caught fisheries management. As discussed 
in the introduction, the management of wild-caught fisheries has been challenged by many 
drawbacks such as poor management infrastructures, as evidenced by the collapse of the 
Newfoundland cod fishery in the early 1990’s. This situation and similar problems around 
the world created space for new management options over the past three decades. The 
purpose of the chapter, therefore, is to provide a detailed understanding of related existing 
literature that examines new fisheries governance options and to better examine the gaps 
that still exist among these bodies of literature especially regarding the lack of research on 
FIPs. The chapter begins by providing insights about environmental certification for 
fisheries and then provides an overview of the Marine Stewardship Council and its 
standards. The later sections examine Fishery Improvement Projects and the related 
initiatives in the African region and how the region is participating in such new governance 
interventions. 
2.1: Environmental Certification and Fisheries (Seafood) 
The connections between fisheries stock decline and poor management and governance 
systems have been a major challenge as noted by many scholars over the last two decades 
(See Worm et al., 2006; Pauly et al., 2003; 2002; Clausen & Clark, 2005; Jackson et al., 
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2001). Fisheries experts and practitioners have repeatedly called for a more collaborative 
management of the resource between governments and  private authorities (Potts & 
Haward, 2007). Generally, governments all over the world have the sovereign rights to 
develop and implement fisheries management initiatives within their jurisdictions (200 
nautical miles and economic exclusive zone), and to develop marine protection and 
conservation plans through various policies, acts, and legislation (Allison & Horemans, 
2006). These government-sanctioned policies, such as the allocation of fishing rights, 
harvest control procedures, co-management systems and fishing gear restrictions are 
usually developed through local policy efforts alongside internationally agreed guidelines 
for the management of fishery resources (Frazen et al. 2016; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997).  
The enforcement of fisheries legislation and policies is often not strong enough to support 
the effective management and proper use of fishery resources on a case by case basis to 
acceptable sustainability levels (See Costello et al., 2016; Deighan & Jenkins, 2015). 
Considering the continuous and ubiquitous nature of poor management with weak 
conservation policies within the fishery sector, many practitioners and environmental 
NGOs have advanced and advocated the need for a new and more pragmatic fishery 
governance and management systems (Konefal, 2013). Since the 1990s, eco-labeling or 
eco-certification of seafood has been promoted as an alternative regulatory and governance 
option through the use of market forces and incentives usually in the form of market access, 
price premiums or other reputational rewards for sustainable practices (Ponte, 2008). Eco-
labelling and certification programs have been introduced in many natural resource sectors, 
such as forestry via the Forest Stewardship Council’s certification and eco-labeling 
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program, to encourage sustainability and proper use of resources through efforts to harness 
consumers preferences (Cashore, Auld & Newson, 2004; Bartley, 2003; Jacquet & Pauly, 
2007). These programs are also designed to provide compensation in some cases, though 
not necessarily in all contexts, for the extra production costs and encourage environmental 
stewardship within various fisheries (Blomquist, Bartolino, & Waldo, 2015; Goyert et al., 
2010).  
The Global Eco-Labelling Network (2004) defines eco-labeling “as a label which identifies 
overall environmental preference of a product or service within a particular 
product/service category based on life cycle considerations” (p.1). Also, many researchers 
in the field of seafood eco-labeling often have defined eco-labeling. For example, per 
Wakamatsu & Wakamatsu (2017): 
Eco-labeling is a market-driven mechanism that incentivizes environment-
friendly production processes. Direct regulation, the standard method for 
resource conservation, guides harvester behavior to positively impact fisheries 
that are suffering from overfishing and depleting stock (p.97) 
Practically, achieving an ecolabel for any product, say seafood, is very rigorous and costly 
to achieve. It entails detailed assessment (usually biological, but sometimes social and 
cultural) by experts and stakeholders involved with the production processes of the product 
(through with specific requirements as with the case of the MSC blue label) which must 
meet certain guidelines or criteria (Phillips et al., 2003). Focusing on consumer preferences 
or interests, ecolabels communicate to the consumer at the point of purchase specific 
attributes of products (Pérez-Ramírez et al., 2012). Some scholars who study fisheries 
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certification are pessimistic about including economic regulations through the market while 
others are more optimistic (Ponte et al., 2011). 
2.2: The Proliferation of Seafood Eco-Labelling Programs. 
Within the seafood industry, there exists a plethora of eco-labeling programmes supported 
or funded by governments, NGOs, or inter-government agencies aimed at enhancing the 
sustainability of the resource through best practices (Washington & Ababouch, 2011). 
Gudmundsson & Wessells (2000) contend that these programs not only aim at ensuring 
better management of the resource, but through its collective incentive motive, the 
programs also benefit both consumers and fishers too. From their perspective, fishers may 
to some extent benefit from an extra price premium to their production practices while 
consumers are assured about the sustainability of what they buy and consume. In practice, 
however, these benefits are very rare. 
Fisheries are usually categorized into two types, capture fisheries and aquaculture (FAO-
SOFIA, 2016). Table 3 shows some of the prominent certification schemes or bodies for 
both captured fisheries and aquaculture. 
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Table 3. Some selected certification schemes for Captured and Aquaculture fisheries 
Selected Certification Schemes/Bodies 
Captured Fisheries Aquaculture 
The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) 
2Friends of the Sea (FOS) GAA Best Aquaculture Practices (BAP) 
Certification Program 
Naturland Organic Aquaculture 
Marine Eco-label Japan Label Rouge 
Icelandic Responsible Fisheries 
Management Certification Program 
 
Alaska Responsible Fisheries Management 
Certification Program 
 
 
2.2.1: The Marine Stewardship Council 
Scholars have examined the growth of market-oriented governance mechanisms as a way 
to address some of the challenges in various sectors through government and private 
authority interactions (Büthe 2010; Gulbrandsen, 2014; Gale & Haward, 2011). Among 
such private or non-state governance organizations is Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), 
the most prominent third-party certifiers for wild-caught fisheries. As of writing, more than 
12% of global fisheries were participating in its program around the world (MSC Annual 
Report 2016-17). In a context of collapsing fisheries and growing interest in market 
                                                          
2 Certifies both Captured and Aquaculture fisheries 
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mechanisms of governance, one of the world’s largest buyers of seafood, Unilever PLC, 
and the world most recognized international environmental organization, WWF, partnered 
to found the MSC in 1997 (Foley 2013; Ponte, 2012; Potts, 2006). From its inception, the 
MSC has had an overarching motivation to promote and ensure healthy and sustainable 
wild-caught fisheries through the promotion of robust third-party scientific assessments for 
fisheries globally (Ward & Phillips, 2008; Phillips et al., 2003). 
Since the late 1990s, the MSC has been operating independently, administering standards 
for a fishery to be considered certified and to attain the right to use the blue label (Pérez-
Ramírez et al., 2012). Referenced in many publications and MSC documents (for examples 
MSC, 1998; May et al., 2002; Potts, 2006), the MSC environmental standard for 
sustainable and well-managed fisheries are categorized into three broad measurable 
principles: (1) the health of fish stocks or target species conditions; (2) the fisheries impact 
to the ecological, environmental and marine ecosystems; and (3) the effectiveness of the 
management structure or system of the fishery.  MSC standards are set based partly on 
guidelines from the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization and the 
International Social and Environmental Accreditation and Labelling (ISEAL) alliance.  
2.2.2: Operationalization of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) 
The MSC has two separate modes of operationalization namely, the “MSC standard and 
scoring system” and the “MSC Chain of Custody Certification and Fishery Traceability” 
(MSC, 2011). Based on these processes set by the MSC, accredited third-party certification 
bodies implement a scoring system for applicant fisheries by responding to 31 key 
questions. Performance Indicators (PIs) are commonly used in MSC compendia in 
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reference to these questions. PIs are groups of parameters which covers all the three-
principal standards of the MSC as mentioned above. Since each PI represents a specific 
question, there exists 31 PIs that are scored on a range from 1 -100 (MSC, n.d). These PIs 
are further grouped into different key levels or sustainability benchmarks that show an 
overall performance of a fishery in terms of its sustainability. It is worth mentioning that 
these benchmarks or levels, also known as the MSC’s scoring system, were developed in 
the 1990s by experts including scientists, fishery managers, and other participants from 
both national and international institutions (MSC, n.d).  
The sustainability benchmarks simply refer to the required levels based on MSC standards. 
These levels are scored normally at 60, 80 and 100 levels. So, the MSC requires that each 
indicator score of 60 or above but requires an overall average of 80 within each of the three 
assessment categories. Here, having a score of 100 implies a “near perfect” fishery situation 
in terms of its management, with a very low-risk situation and effects to the fish population 
and its ecosystem and has an unconditional pass from the MSC. Secondly, a score of 80 
represents a “global best practice” with an acceptable management method which has a 
long-term potential for sustainability and a reasonable or acceptable level of risk with a 
conditional pass from the MSC pertaining to PI scores below 80. And lastly, a score of 60 
represents a fishery with a “minimum acceptable limit” as required by the MSC. It depicts 
the minimum required certainty or allowed risk. Any fishery below this score is considered 
failed and a fishery must score an overall average of at least an 80 within each of the three 
categories of principles (MSC, 2011).  
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The next stage of the MSC assessment process after the scoring is the “MSC Chain of 
Custody certification and fishery traceability”, commonly referred to as MSC CoC. This 
MSC system is designed to give an assurance through details and documented information 
of the fishery bearing the MSC label that it is from a sustainable and certified source. It 
provides relevant information about the kind of vessels used in harvesting the fishery right 
up to  the point of first sale (MSC, n.d). It provides necessary information which can assist 
buyers or consumers or others in tracing a seafood product back to the source. The MSC 
CoC applies to market actors such as companies that buy and sell seafood products from 
certified fisheries. As per the MSC (2015), the CoC standard has been divided into five 
principles which are: 
(1) Principle 1: “Certified products are purchased from certified suppliers”. This 
principle clearly stipulates three key requirements which must be met by the fishery. 
This requirement covers the general regularities the certified product must go 
through to ensure it is from a sustainable source, from the initial stock audit 
information, the physical handling of the products and the assurance that the product 
meets all necessary conformities to bear the MSC eco-label. 
(2) Principle 2: “Certified products are identifiable”. This principle provides 
information and communication of the fishery product with four key expectations 
for the product. It spells out the need for the product to remain labeled throughout 
its entire market process from harvesters to processing and finally delivery. The 
product may carry a readable invoice at the point of sale and for those carrying the 
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label. It must at all times carry the information and full name and logo of the 
ecolabel or other related trademarks and the license agreement. 
(3) Principle 3: “Certified products are segregated”: With three key expectations, 
this principle outlines the need for distinction or separation of certified products 
from non-certified ones. No matter the extent of collaboration between the MSC 
CoC with any other product, there should never be mixing of certified and non-
certified products. 
(4) Principle 4: “Certified products are traceable, and volumes are recorded”. 
With six categorized expectations within this principle, principle 4 stipulates the 
need for a traceability system of the product that provides an easy channel through 
which a certified supplier can trace back any product being sold once it is certified. 
The traceability records will contain details of all stages of the product development 
and the records must be accurate, complete with no faulty values used. Above all 
the organization shall be in charge of compiling all these details related to the 
seafood product from its volume to processing right up to delivery. 
(5) Principle 5: “The organization has a management system”. This is quite an 
overarching principle that covers six key issues namely; “Management and 
training, reporting changes, sub-contractors, transport and contract processing, 
non-conforming products, requests for traceability and supply chain assurance and 
finally specific requirements for under-assessment product” (MSC, 2015, p.11-16). 
This principle stipulates the need for the organization to train its personnel and make 
sure they are competent in their activities and duties. The focus here is strictly on 
recording and storage of all relevant information. Also, the organization must be 
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able to have necessary contact persons within the MSC to be able to make all 
necessary contacts and information relating to the CoC requirements. Secondly, the 
organization must contact the certifier through appropriate channels within 10 days 
in writing or by email of any changes in their certified products or new MSC 
contacts for the organization. This request or changes reported will go through the 
normal procedures and approval where necessary. Furthermore, the organization 
must be able to effectively communicate with all persons or bodies working within 
the organization from transportation, processing, packaging, and delivery, with all 
necessary documents of agreements or MOUs. Also, the organization must within 
2 days immediately report any nonconforming products to the certifier and provide 
necessary information, alongside a request for traceability documents from the 
MSC and certified for proper labeling of the product with relevant and needed 
information. Lastly, details must be provided for the fishery undergoing 
assessments. Organizations undergoing assessment must meet the following 
requirements:  
“All under-assessment products shall be clearly identified and segregated 
from certified and non-certified products; The organization shall maintain full 
traceability records for all under-assessment product, demonstrating 
traceability back to the unit of certification and including the date of harvest; 
and finally, under-assessment products shall not be sold as certified or 
labelled with the ecolabel, logo, or trademarks until the source fishery or farm 
is certified” (MSC, 2015. P.16). 
2.2.3: The Marine Stewardship Certification Process and its Challenges 
The MSC certification process is an interesting, lengthy and very demanding process for 
any fishery that decides to get involved. Before any certification can be granted by the 
29 
 
MSC, the fishery must first undergo a pre-assessment. Upon request from a fishery client, 
a pre-assessment is carried out by an MSC-accredited third-party organization to determine 
if it can proceed to a full assessment and finally certification and to identify any issues it 
needs to address or make improvements before proceeding to full assessment 
(Gulbrandsen, 2009). Pre-assessment results are usually kept confidential by the fishery 
client, though in some cases the client shares the outcomes or issues raised to participating 
stakeholders or actors through various channels as deemed necessary by the client (See 
Bridgeman Group, 2004). With satisfactory outcomes from the pre-assessment, the fishery 
can then decide to move into a full assessment process. But it is worth noting that the pre-
assessment is optional, not mandatory, and solely at the discretion of the fishery (Howes, 
2008). According to Chaffee, Phillips & Ward (2003), however, the pre-assessment is 
widely considered a necessary foundation. Relevant documents emerging from the pre-
assessment process are shared with the client and its stakeholders and include information 
on how the fishery can successfully pass a full assessment to meet the MSC standard, how 
it can address identified challenges or problems, and where possible, the estimated cost for 
the fishery to be assessed fully. Generally, the transition from pre-assessment to full 
assessment is not easy. Many fisheries fail to pass this stage due to environmental and 
management problems that need to be addressed. And it is with respect to these challenges 
that FIPs were developed to help fisheries meet acceptable levels of environmental 
sustainability. 
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The decision to go into the full MSC assessment solely relies on the fishery applicant/client. 
Generally, the MSC has seven stages embedded in its guidelines for fishery certification 
processes as outlined below: 
1. An announcement of the fishery going into full assessment: Here, the accredited 
certification body makes a formal announcement and provides information to all 
stakeholders that the fishery is undergoing a full assessment upon request by the 
responsible parties who are identified at this stage as clients. Subsequently, an 
assessment team is set up that comprises three to four members, as well as an auditor 
or lead person from the accredited certification body (MSC, 2013). The experts 
chosen are generally people who can assess the fishery based on the three key MSC 
standards. This announcement generally comes with the identification of the fishing 
area or locality, the target species, gear types, and any other relevant information 
necessary for the assessment process. Within this stage, the MSC is informed and 
then communicates the announcement to key stakeholders. It also updates the 
fishery’s information on its website and issues an official press release together with 
the client carrying relevant information about the fishery (MSC, 2015). 
2. Creation of an assessment tree3 where necessary: The assessment team at this 
stage can decide to either use the default version of the assessment tree which had 
been adapted to suit most fisheries and to ensure consistency, accuracy, and 
transparency in the process or to develop its own assessment tree. If they decide not 
                                                          
3 The Assessment tree is a series of interconnected scientific and ecological parameters set by the MSC in 
which accredited auditors use to assess a fishery and see if it meets the standards to certification set by the 
MSC  
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to use the default version, there must be a 30 days period with stakeholder 
consultations to review and comment on the assessment tree to be used. The 
assessment tree generally comprises of a technical layout on how each of the three 
MSC principles will be assessed, based on their specific criteria. According to 
Howes (2008), there are 23 of such criteria from a breakdown of the three principles. 
Aside from assessing these principles, the other key ecological and ecosystem 
related parameters (e.g. conservation plans, open and close seasons) assessed and 
scored are open to the general public or participating stakeholders for their own 
comments and queries. This latter process is implicated in the assessment owing to 
variations in the type of fisheries and conditions in which the fishery finds itself 
(Bush, Toonen, Oosterveer, & Mol, 2013). Generally, this process all sums up to 
the final score of the fishery based on the MSC scoring guide as earlier explained 
(60, 80 or 100). 
3. Information gathering through stakeholder consultation and scoring: After 
gathering all relevant information about the fishery through the assessment method 
as described above, the team then undertakes a visit to the fishery. During this visit, 
they talk with and interview stakeholders to make sure they have accurate 
information or clarifying any thoughts. After this, the team then uses the 
information to score the fishery based on the assessment tree. The use of all relevant 
information from peer-reviewed articles, grey literature, reports and other technical 
reports are very important in the final scoring of the fishery in question. 
4. Client and peer review: Here, the assessment team prepares and compiles a draft 
report about all their findings and scoring of the fishery. The preliminary report is 
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then shared with the client for them to comment on and to make any queries about 
or suggestions to the final report. Thereafter, the certification body or assessment 
team will arrange and send the report to individual peer reviewers who are experts 
who understand the whole MSC standards, criteria, and certification process and 
who are fisheries experts (MSC, 2013). 
5. Public review of the draft report:  Together with the clients and the independent 
peer reviewers, a complete report is made, and the assessment or certification body 
will develop and submit the “Public Comment Draft Report” to the MSC. Then the 
MSC will share the report with stakeholders and publish it on msc.org, where the 
public and stakeholders have 30 days to make comments on the draft report which 
contains information as to whether the fishery should be certified or not. It is 
assumed that throughout these processes, the fishery together with its stakeholders 
understands the key issues and targeted areas. If the fishery fails to get certified, 
they can re-apply. 
6. Final report and determination: This final report outlines the assessment team’s 
decision as to whether the fishery should be certified or not, but this is only done 
after comments have been received from the public consultations and comments on 
the draft reports. If the client or other groups/stakeholders are satisfied with the 
outcome (in case they refuse certification), they can refute the decision by following 
the MSC objection procedures within 15 days from getting the final report for it to 
go into full objection process. The objection is being reviewed or followed up by 
an independent adjudicator who makes the final decision on what happens to the 
objections (MSC, 2015). 
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7. Public certification report and getting the MSC certificate: If the final report is 
not objected to and everything is in good shape, the fishery is then certified. The 
certification is valid for a period of five years with provisions for surveillance audits 
and the certification body will make and provide a “Public Certification Report” 
that provides details of the fishery and any recommendations or conditions that must 
be met to maintain certification. Most importantly, “… if your clients become 
certified against the MSC Chain of Custody Standard, products from your MSC 
certified fishery can bear the MSC eco-label on packs and menus” (MSC, 2015, 
p.18) 
2.2.4: The MSC Certification Cost 
According to Peacey (2001), the certification cost for any fishery that wishes to get certified 
can be divided into four key components namely the initial pre-assessment, full fishery 
assessment, the MSC Chain of Custody assessment, and finally the ecolabel logo or license 
fees. It is worth noting that the overall cost depends on factors such as the fishery’s size or 
its assessment complexity and also in terms of  data availability for easy stock assessments 
and the fisheries management structure. The later characteristics directly influence the cost 
of pre-assessment and full assessment of the fishery be it for small or large-scale fisheries 
and on the conditions of the fishery and its recommended improvements that need to be 
done (Pérez-Ramírez, Ponce-Díaz, & Lluch-Cota, 2012). From figures from works of Ponte 
(2006) and Peacey (2001), the pre-assessment may cost from $1000 (USD) to $20, 000, 
while that for a full assessment varies from $10, 000 to $35, 000 for a small-scale fishery 
to an amount up to $100, 000 to $350, 000 for a large scale and complex fishery. 
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Secondly, we have the MSC Chain of custody assessments which are usually done by an 
accredited MSC certifier upon request and payments by a company that wishes to use the 
MSC ecolabel. Its cost varies from less than $1,000 to $5,000. Finally, as per the MSC 
trading arm (MSC International), companies wishing to use the MSC logo must sign a 
license agreement to pay a fee of 0.05% of the product fee for on-product use of its logo. 
Any other cost goes to cover the administrative procedures and costs for getting the license, 
especially for off-product use (Peacey, 2001). So generally, from the figures above, the 
certification cost is quite high for small-scale fisheries, which are mostly found in 
developing countries such as those in Africa. Related to this, the objection procedure to an 
MSC full assessment also comes with a cost. As of 2010, an objection could cost up to 
$5,000 to a lower rate of $1,000 with all necessary parties’ involvement in the process 
(adjudicators) (Jacquet et al., 2010). 
 
2.3: Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) 
2.3.1: Historical background of FIPs 
Created from an alliance of 16 different conservation organizations/groups in 2012 focused 
on enhancing the sustainability of seafood resources, the Conservation Alliance for Seafood 
Solutions4 (CASS) has been a very powerful and dominant body coordinating the whole 
FIP concept and guidelines (CASS, n.d). They unanimously agreed on the FIP definition, 
which stipulates its key tenets and expectations. Though the CASS definition is widely used 
                                                          
4 CASS is an Alliance of NGOs with well defined and agreed guidelines with the contributions of private 
firms and consultancy 
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and cited within various literatures, other proponents of the FIP have their own definitions 
like the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership and WWF. According to SFP (n.d),  
“A FIP is an alliance of stakeholders - retailers, processors, producers, and/or 
catchers - that comes together to resolve problems within a specific fishery or 
improve some specific aspect of the fishery that requires attention. The FIP 
works through key organizations and individuals, talking through management 
of the fishery and the challenges that it may face, identifying data that needs to 
be collected, agreeing on a set of priority actions that should be undertaken to 
improve the fishery, and then overseeing an action plan” (SFP, n.d, p.1) 
FIPs generally started within developed world fisheries contexts but have been extended to 
advance better fisheries management and improvement techniques for those in developing 
countries as well (See Bush and Oosterveer, 2015; Sampson et al., 2015). FIPs emerged 
with the objective to assist interested fisheries to improve and move towards environmental 
sustainability and where possible MSC certification (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015). NGOs and 
private firms or private entities have acted as major players in the development of FIP 
guidelines and procedures over the last decade with the motivation to move fisheries 
towards sustainability. Often, major seafood companies and retailers have funded directly 
and/or purchased fish from fisheries they see as potential FIP candidates without 
necessarily granting fisheries a premium (Frazen et al., 2016). Through the Conservation 
Alliance, who coordinates FIP guidelines, organizations such as the WWF and the 
Sustainable Fisheries Partnership (SFP) have been key players promoting FIPs globally 
though with varying institutional models or modes of FIP operations (See WWF, 2014; 
SFP, 2012). 
36 
 
According to Sampson et al., the motivation of actors to participate in a FIP often depends 
on the fishery and fishers targeted and the extent to which they can collaborate with existing 
institutions surrounding the fishery activities, which definitely varies from case to case 
(Sampson et al., 2015). With such variation in actors’ interest and motivation within FIPs 
and using findings by the California Environmental Associates (2015), Frazen et al. (2016) 
outlines two general categories of FIP implementation: “‘bottom-up’ development-oriented 
FIPs, often led by NGOs stimulating general improvements to government support and 
regulation; and ‘top-down’ market-oriented FIPs, led by firms focused on direct economic 
benefits for fishers in return for strict compliance” (p. 2). Related to these variations in the 
FIP model as posited above, the participation or willingness of actors, especially fishers’ 
decisions in these FIPs, is usually important to the kind of improvement to be done to the 
fishery (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015). But Frazen et al. (using the case of two FIPs for yellow 
Tuna in the Philippines), citing scholarly works of Sen (1990), argues that capabilities are 
a relevant issue that influences fishers’ decision to participate in FIPs and whether they 
meet the desired requirement in understanding their participation in a FIP.  
These particular characteristics of FIPs and FIP implementation in local contexts are also 
occurring within a global context. Map 3 shows world-wide coverage of the different FIP 
levels, illustrating the global proliferation of FIPs within a decade from its initiation 
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Figure 1: A global representation of FIPs in the world. The map was done courtesy to the 
GIS expertise of Myron Kings (Environmental Policy Institute, MUN) 
FIPs can be understood as part of a more general global trend of the growth of non-state 
actors engaging in governance. FIPs have been driven by environmental NGOs in the most 
general sense. In specific cases of implementation, environmental NGOs and private 
consultancy firms have in some instances played leadership roles in FIP processes, as in 
the yellow tuna Philippines FIP led by both WWF-Philippines, a private company, and a 
consultancy firm (Meliomar and BlueYou -Switzerland). This thus gives private and non-
state actors more access into fishery management and possible eco-certification processes 
if the fishery’s stakeholders so wishes, but the ultimate aim for FIP is to improve the 
sustainability of the fisheries (Deighan & Jenkins, 2015; Bush et al., 2013). Providing 
support to fisheries that seek improvement or those transitioning to sustainable certification 
is the official rational and objective that motivated WWF, SFP and others to create FIP 
guidelines through the Conservation Alliance of NGOs for those interested in the early 
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2010s (WWF, 2014). The WWF instituted FIPs to help fisheries work towards getting the 
MSC standard with its processing differing somewhat from those of other NGOs such as 
the SFP (See Frazen et al., 2016). These dynamics illustrate some of the central actors and 
processes involved in the evolution and implementation of FIPs.  
2.3.2 Governance dynamics of FIP Processes  
FIPs are also part of a general governance trend of emphasizing the role of multiple 
stakeholders in collaborative initiatives. Each FIP is expected to involve multiple 
stakeholders working within a specific fishery (WWF-US, 2013). With support from NGOs 
and other agents, FIPs are programs or projects (long or short run) that utilize funding from 
various sources to assist fisheries that, in most cases, wish to get improved or, in many 
cases, to have their fishery improve chances to succeed in MSC assessments (Bush et al., 
2013). Using market forces and strengths, FIP results and operations are sometimes 
motivated by the attractive business and working environment between actors and agents 
such as fishermen, industries, retailers and sponsors to ensure the sustainable use and 
market access of the resource (Roheim, Asche & Insignares Santos, 2011). These 
descriptions suggest that the motivations and interests of actors often align but they can 
also differ in some important aspects as well within the improvement process. 
Generally, multi-stakeholder involvement and participation is the main procedural driving 
force of the FIP as a means to improve management of the resource. The reliance on 
stakeholders (NGOs, funders, retailers, industry, fishermen and their groups) means that 
the process requires organization and coordination amongst them. They work together and 
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move the fishery towards sustainability and possibly certification through the use of the 
CASS guidelines and other sustainability indicators (MSC, 2015).  
2.3.2: Types of Fishery Improvement Projects 
According to the alliance as spelled out above (CASS), a FIP can be engaged at two 
different levels namely; the basic and comprehensive levels. Their differences primarily 
depend on the level of commitment or scoping and what needs to be addressed by the FIP. 
The basic level looks specifically at a particular environmental or ecosystem related 
problem while a comprehensive FIP is a more broad-based and intensive FIP where the 
whole fishery is assessed and improved to meet global sustainability standards usually 
those of the MSC (CASS, n.d). 
A basic level FIP is generally characterized with its simple model and a very low cost 
geared towards addressing  a specific problem of the fishery. It generally follows the 
bottom-up approach in its supply chain engagements where the fishery in the FIP can access 
the market with its sustainability claim and commitments, and a third party or FIP 
implementer, usually an NGO, is assigned to lead the FIP (California Environmental 
Associates and Scaling Blue report, 2015). The scoping document for such a FIP identifies 
an environmental issue or need that is to be addressed following the three principles of the 
MSC environmental standard with a defined timeline and defined objectives to improve the 
outlined indicator. Although the FIP goes through an independent audit for activity results, 
basic FIPs are not necessarily required to be checked against the MSC standards (CASS, 
n.d). 
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On the other hand, comprehensive FIPs are high-profile and high-cost models that aim 
towards meeting all the required MSC performance indicators and possibly MSC 
certification within a very short timeframe. In its supply chain engagements, it generally 
follows a top-down approach where buyers and/or wholesale dealers through business ties 
and other relationships identify a fishery with great market prospects and decides to 
motivate it into a FIP (CASS, n.d). With such an engagement in the FIP, the fishery 
conditions generally improve and become flagged as sustainable in the market. This 
happens with the industry being the primary promoter, with coordinated and specified 
stakeholders’ involvement depending on their own identified activities, and with 
professional advice from NGOs where needed or possible (California Environmental 
Associates and Scaling Blue report, 2015). As with the later level of FIP, a comprehensive 
FIP scoping document must be made public and available to anyone, but with a key 
difference that it must engage experts that are knowledgeable and able to apply the MSC 
standards completely in its pre-assessment. Here, there is a well-defined time frame for the 
fisheries to address all relevant environmental challenges that will help improve its 
performance and possibly enable the fishery to pass MSC assessment. Through an 
independent auditor, comprehensive FIPs are audited every 3 years by an expert appointed 
by the FIP lead organization or partner (CASS,n.d).  
In summary, the choice of FIP depends on the stakeholders’ levels of engagement, funding, 
and priorities for the particular fishery. With adequate supporting documents, both levels 
of FIPs must publicly report their activities and results every month and those already listed 
as a FIP under the FIP directory tracking website are annually reviewed by the 
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Conservation Alliance itself. The FIP directory, accessed through the website 
fisheryprogress.org, provides detailed information on the fishery and the type of FIP it is 
engaged with. 
2.3.3: Stages/Process for Fishery Improvement Projects. 
Several proponents of FIPs such as the WWF and the Sustainable Fishery Partnership (SFP) 
have over the years developed what is usually referred to as different phases, stages or 
processes of a FIP. However, the Conservation Alliance for Seafood Solutions of NGOs 
has refined various processes to promote six principal stages of a FIP. As adapted from the 
SFP, figure 4 shows the various stages, stakeholders, and expectations of a FIP at each of 
its independent stages. According to the SFP (2017), the various stages of a FIP are 
considered independent. However, all step-wise guidelines or sequences of a FIP depend 
on the objectives and goals of the fishery and what level of FIP the fishery is considered to 
be (basic or comprehensive).  
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Figure 2. The Fishery Improvement Project Framework. Source: Retrieved from the Coastal 
Resources Center of the University of Rhode Island (2014) 
 
43 
 
It is worth mentioning that, as per CASS, there is an initial Stage 0, often known as the FIP 
identification process. Here, a fishery is identified by its participating stakeholders as 
having the potential of getting into a FIP, has adequate stakeholder and partner 
involvement, and has viable market access and linkages proven through market demand. 
From available information via SFP and CASS (n.d p 12 – 17), the 6 different stages of the 
FIP can be summarised as a process which helps us understand actors, motivations and 
their levels of interaction amongst existing participants. The FIP stages define the relevant 
players needed for the functioning of the FIP. They are:  
Stage 1 – FIP Development: Depending on the level of FIP, an independent auditor reports 
from different sources (e.g., MSC pre-assessments, Seafood Watch reports, FishSource 
evaluations, or scoping documents from the third-party auditor which are generally made 
public), spells out the challenges of the fishery and identifies items it needs to improve on, 
to either attain sustainability or meet certification to standards set by the MSC. These 
processes are mostly considered for the case of a comprehensive FIP level. The assessment 
report is instrumental as it outlines a different kind of stakeholder engagement, their roles, 
and expectations within the FIP. Stakeholders here include the fishermen themselves and 
their associations if they exist, related government departments, industry (processors and 
exporters), researchers, NGOs and most importantly the funders. There is generally a need 
for transparency in choosing what kind of stakeholder participates, which can include 
consideration of their motivation or interest in the fishery in a manner that benefits all the 
parties. The key point to note here is the identification of improvement needs, stakeholders’ 
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involvement, with observation for transparency. Moreover, all information is readily 
available to the public. 
Stage 2 – FIP Launch: This stage is a direct reflection of the success of the intended 
activities of stage 1. Here, participants implicated in the FIP are made known and the 
development of a FIP work plan or processes is clearly articulated and made public. 
Through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), relevant stakeholders of the FIP are 
identified and made known to the public through publications of the fisheryprogress.org 
website as in some cases, and they all must meet and determine the work plan of the FIP. 
With a recommendation from stage 1, the work plan is developed based on the lapses or 
needs identified which will subsequently become the objectives of the FIP. Aside from the 
objectives, a work plan must constitute a complete list of activities, responsible actors and 
stakeholders, a well-defined time frame, its performance indicators and the proposed 
budget adopted by all participants. The work plan is not made public. It is usually developed 
based on the availability of resources and capacities for the efficient and timely 
achievement of the objectives laid out. Where necessary, the FIP can make feasible 
alliances or partnerships with other institutions or organizations which can better assist 
them, laying the groundwork for further potential actors and multi-stakeholder interactions. 
Stage 3 – FIP Implementation: Specifically, the work plan for any FIP outlines the various 
roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, each of them at this stage starts to implement 
their activities and provide relevant reports that show their progress. Relating to reporting 
on the progress of activities, no matter the level of FIP, reporting is done every six months 
and is generally made public or through the FIP Directory website (fisheryprogress.org), 
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and this will also include an annual report on the FIP made by CASS through the same 
alliance tracking website. With an exception for comprehensive FIPs only, the FIP must, 
after a three-year period, hire a well known technical consultant who understands the MSC 
standards, to audit and report on the activities of the FIP based on standards set by the MSC. 
This is usually done by those mostly referred in many certification compendia as 
Conformity Assessment Body (CAB) and are third-party independent organizations not 
directly involved in the FIP implementation. It is worth noting here that, the interaction, 
and motivation of stakeholders and their capacity to adopt better technologies or policies is 
key to achieving their specific roles and activities. 
Stage 4 – Improvements in fishery policies, management, and practices: Every country 
has legal sovereignty over fisheries within 200 miles and fisheries management policies are 
usually put in place by the government. But how these policies translate to the sustainability 
of the fishery is always a major question. So basically, FIPs often target changes to 
government policies or actions addressing the way the fishery is managed. These changes 
are intended to improve overall FIP and MSC performance indicators. 
Stage 5 - Major improvements in the water: By examining scientific evidence, physical 
changes and local knowledge of fisheries, stakeholders can themselves attest if there is an 
improvement or not. An assessment of scientific parameters such as bycatch rates, fishing 
mortality, fish stock biomass and other ecosystem or habitat indicators enables a good 
assessment of improvements made to the fishery. 
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Stage 6 – Getting MSC certification: This is generally an ultimate aim for most FIPs. It 
is solely the choice and decision for the fishery and its stakeholders to chose whether to 
pursue and achieve the MSC certification. But generally, the decision to go through the 
MSC assessment and certification process needs significant additional and ongoing 
resources. 
2.3.4: A Practical FIP Case – The Philippines Yellowfin Tuna FIP 
Although there are few studies of FIPs, a brief description of one studied case in a 
developing country context provides some useful insight into the process. Frazen et al., 
(2016) conceptualize the inclusion and participation of small-scale fishers within FIPs 
using two models of FIPs for the Yellowfin Tuna, with both models geared towards better 
improvements of the fishery. The models include “the NGO led Partnership Program 
Towards Sustainable Tuna which adopts a bottom-up or development-oriented FIP model 
and the Private-led Artesmar FIP which adopts a top-down or market-oriented FIP 
approach” (p.1). These models are in addition to the two levels of FIPs as explained above 
which categorizes the kind of engagement needed to address improvement issues related to 
the FIP (i.e., the basic, less cost-intensive FIP and the comprehensive and more resource 
and capacity-intensive FIP; see California Environmental Associates, 2015).  
According to the California Environmental Associates, the NGO-led, bottom-up model of 
FIP is one in which the participants first focus on getting the fishery improved to an 
acceptable level before sourcing for better market options. Here, collective firms or group 
efforts are important for the development and improvement of the fishery. On the other 
hand, the latter model (private-led, top-down) FIP model is one in which substantial buyer 
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and market demand are identified before improvements are done to the fishery and here, 
individual firm capabilities are key in achieving the improvement needed for the fishery to 
satisfy their clients. With this model, the market drivers, and retailers, with the promise of 
better market access for the fishery, force participants to get engaged in improvement 
efforts for the fishery and garner market advantages.  
For the Yellow Tuna FIP, the privately led Artesmar FIP is run by two private entities 
(Meliomar, a private company, and BlueYou, a consultancy firm). They use economic 
incentives to motivate and encourage fishers to participate in the FIP with their target to 
meet high levels of sustainability. The next model (the NGO-led Partnership program 
Towards Sustainability) is a FIP that WWF-Philippines is coordinating. It aims at 
advancing better local governance of the fisheries (Tuna) and meeting requirements for the 
global or general value chain for fisheries and fisheries products. By improving the local 
governance system, fishers are given a place for participation in the process. The aim of 
this FIP focused on the yellow Tuna is to address some of the problems plaguing the fishery 
(e.g overfishing). These dynamics, therefore, illustrate the different types of actors and 
interactions emerging in FIPs in developing country context, including a mix of 
international NGOs, market actors, and local fisheries.  
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2.4: Fishery Eco-certification, Governance and Improvement Projects in the African 
Context. 
Eco-Labeling initiatives in Africa are mostly sectorial and national labeling programs. Most 
sectorial programs or initiatives in the African Region are developed based on procedures 
and certification to standards set by international non-governmental eco-label schemes such 
as the MSC or the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), with only one major program 
identified by the researcher as having specific origins to the Africa Region (the Tunisian 
eco-label administered by the government through a decree in 1997) (Janisch, 2007). 
Different regional ecolabelling schemes have been developed and implemented within 
sectors such as the “East African Organic Standard” and the “West African Organic 
Cotton” programs. Such eco-labeling schemes are administered by the government with 
support from NGOs and agencies within Africa or African Union. 
2.4.1: Fisheries Sector in Perspective 
As earlier mentioned, eco-labeling or certification within the fishery sector arises from 
failure from existing institutions, policies or acts that address issues of overfishing globally 
to regulate and control fishing efforts coupled with the increasing demand for fish 
worldwide (FAO, 2016; Ponte, 2008). Generally, there is still a need for new approaches 
or ways in which fisheries can be better managed and sustained, and market tools such as 
eco-certification can be considered useful options (Parkes et al., 2010). The rising demand 
for certified seafood products in the international market has also necessitated the need for 
various governments and regional bodies to move their fisheries towards a certification that 
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can improve their competitiveness (Johnston & Roheim, 2006). These global dynamics and 
pressures have also manifested in the developing world and African context.  
Various wild caught fish statistics show that developing country fishing industries 
contribute a major quantity of fish or fisheries products on a global scale, but they are still 
the least eco-certified. In recognition of this existing problem within the fisheries sector in 
Africa, Janisch (2007) outlines “The Abuja Declaration of Sustainable Fisheries and 
Aquaculture in Africa adopted by the Heads of State meeting of the NEPAD ‘Fish for All 
Summit’ in Abuja, Nigeria,  in August 2005, to recognise the following”(p.19): 1) The 
reliance of  many small-scale agrarian populations of Africa on fishing and aquaculture 
activities for their subsistence and  better livelihood, 2) the potentials and opportunities to 
be acquired by the fishing industry from a more open and rigorous market opportunities for 
Africa’s fisheries both locally and globally, and 3) the rapid and uncontrolled depletion of 
fisheries resources, and aquatic communities that threatens sustainability of the resources. 
With this fundamental recognition,  
“The Abuja Declaration, therefore, resolves to improve governance of fisheries 
to ensure environmental sustainability, specifically by ratifying international 
conventions on sustainable aquatic systems and to contribute to the creation of 
an enabling environment for sustainable fisheries. The declaration provides 
clear evidence of the relevance of eco-labeling to fisheries in the African 
region” (Janisch, 2007, p.19). 
This process, therefore, indicates that key stakeholders were seriously improving 
governance through international processes including eco-labeling by the early 2000s.   
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2.4.2: Marine Stewardship Council in Africa 
In 2004, the South African Hake fishery became the first fishery in Africa to be certified to 
the MSC. At the time, it contributed more than 150,000kg of white fish to the MSC 
programme, at a cost of US$ 100 000 for the fishery (Goyert et al., 2010; Ponte, 2008). 
From there onwards, the process of certification in Africa has been very slow with just two 
key pilot fishery certification projects, namely the Mauritania Banc d’Arguin Mullet fishery 
and the Gambian Sole Fishery, even though there are other prospective fisheries engaging 
the MSC process at early stages.  
Within that context, the African Union- Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resource (AU-
IBAR) and its coordinating agency, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency 
(NPCA), began implementing a Fisheries Governance Project since early 2015 titled 
“Strengthening Institutional Capacity to Enhance Governance of the Fisheries Sector in 
Africa”, funded by the European Union (EU) (ARC and UNEP, 2007). Its key activities of 
addressing food insecurity issues and economic growth in Africa aim to strengthen and 
increase capacities for access to markets by strengthening the capacity of African Union 
Member States (AU-MS) in fisheries improvement programmes for eco-labeling 
certification activities (AU-IBAR, 2015). In realizing and implementing these activities, 
AU-IBAR through NPCA and the MSC organized a meeting in Abidjan, Cote D’Ivoire in 
July 2015 with the main objective of creating awareness of eco-labeling certification 
processes in fisheries for informed decision making by AU-MS. The meeting had technical 
sessions with representatives from the MSC presenting on how FIPs could be implemented 
in the region, but generally the meeting was held under the umbrella objective of an 
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“Awareness creation workshop on Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) for eco-labelling 
certification towards sustainable fisheries and market access” (See AU-IBAR, 2015 
meeting report). The initiative developed in a context in which Africa’s fisheries were 
increasingly challenged with the global demand and acceptance by retailers of eco-labeled 
fish and fishery products by recognizing bodies such as the MSC and the Aquaculture 
Stewardship Council (ASC). Preliminary reports from these organizations show that 
African fisheries are challenged with lack of capacity and resources to meet the required 
market expectations both locally and at the international scale.  
Within this context and for wild-caught fisheries, the MSC is promoting its two standards 
for its certification (sustainability and seafood traceability) and encouraging the 
implementation of Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) for fisheries to meet these 
standards. As noted above, FIPs generally aim at (a) improving the environmental 
performance of a fishery (b) involving partnerships (fishers, markets, government, NGOs, 
funders) (c) providing incentives for fisheries that do not currently meet the MSC standard 
and (d) creating frameworks for management to address governance issues in fisheries 
(Deighan & Jenkins, 2015; AU-IBAU, 2015; MSC, 2013). 
2.4.3 Challenges of Fisheries Eco-Labelling in Africa and the MSC process 
Fishing industries in developing countries contribute a major share of fish and fish products 
to the international market, but they are still challenged with meeting certification costs 
compared to those in the developed world (Gulbrandsen, 2010; Cashore et al., 2006). 
Though simple analysis indicates challenges encountered with respect to the various 
certification costs and requirements, there is also an overall lack of capacity for organizing 
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or verifying environmental stewardship by those in the industry. In most cases, there exist 
no well-organized management structures and information gathering systems that can 
facilitate an overall analysis of the fishery in question, thus making its certification cost 
more expensive (Janisch, 2007; Higman & Nussbaum, 2002). However, the ever-increasing 
demand for certified seafood products in the international market compared to those not 
certified leaves developing nations with no option but to join the rest and meet the 
competitive nature of the market. Consumers have become more aware of the importance 
of buying certified products and are to some extent willing to pay extra for products which 
are environmentally certified, thus encouraging developing countries to strive and meet this 
challenge (Sampson et al., 2015; Washington & Ababouch, 2011). Conceptually as Janisch 
(2007) articulates, eco-labeled or certified products have shown that they can increase the 
export Gross Domestic Products (GDP) for most nations in Terms of Trade (TOT), but, 
developing countries, especially those in Africa, do not really have a clear-cut 
understanding of how to garner these benefits. Janisch (2007) suggests that better trade 
deals will help such regions through the proceeds from exports, which in turn might help 
fisheries meet the high cost of certification and get their fishery certified. Another more 
confusing and challenging issue is the numerous number of labels promoted by various 
private and public organizations. Many countries are scared and not willing to lose their 
sovereignty or control of their resources to another private entity. So, the lack of trust 
amongst some stakeholders is a major problem as these new environmental governance 
interventions spread to different national and local contexts (Foley and Havice, 2016; 
Ponte, 2008). 
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In summary, whilst the MSC certification process envisages applicant fisheries meeting 
rigorous standards, the reality is that many fisheries require significant improvements in 
order to meet MSC standards. FIPs have increasingly been utilized by fisheries to meet 
improve to levels that might better enable fisheries to apply for MSC certification, 
particularly in developing countries. African fisheries, though challenged with a weaker 
environmental stewardship and/or weak government capacity, have received increasing 
support from several organizations in terms of policicy formulation, capacity building and 
improvements in technology and fishing activities. The question of power relations and 
interests with respect to the collaboration and interaction of the various actors within these 
FIPs in Africa is usually very difficult to clearly define. Power relations within African 
FIPs will be considered in the later chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1: Introduction 
This chapter critically examines several perspectives and analytical frameworks that 
scholars have used to understand and explain eco-certifications and its related governance 
mechanisms inter alia governance structures. Recognising the plethora of related theories 
often used within such a context, this research highlights critical political economy as an 
analytical approach to examine and advance a better understanding of FIPs governance 
systems in Africa. This holistic perspective is useful because it helps identify the type of 
actors or agents participating, their motivation within the FIP processes, and most 
importantly the interactions between the participants in the FIP process. Political economy 
is also helpful in addressing the core objectives of the thesis because it centers around 
power and interests (who wins/looses/benefits) within any particular realm of multiple 
actors’ motivations, their activities, and interactive engagements. 
3.2 Related Analytical Perspectives and Discourse of certification and FIP schemes. 
To date, there have been numerous theoretical or analytical perspectives used in engaging 
variously  non-state or NGO-led certification and/or labeling programs and schemes. These 
frameworks conceptualize multiple actors’ involvement within the MSC, and its  related 
concepts such as the FIPs for fisheries around the world (see for example Bush & 
Oosterveer, 2015 and Cashore, 2002). To provide more insights into some of these theories, 
the following sections provide a general overview and analysis of some useful theories or 
concepts by outlining their strengths and weaknesses and how they fit into existing 
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scholarly debates and discourses within the context of certification and FIPs as 
environmental governance interventions.    
3.2.2 Non-State Market-Driven (MSMD) governance model 
Cashore (2002) originally posited the concept of Non State Market Driven (NSMD) 
governance mechanism to conceptualize the Forest Stewardship Council certification 
system. NSMD conceptualizes the use of economic policy instruments through market-
driven policies to issues that  directly impacts and  influence the  civil society and the 
general business environment (Howlett, 1999). Cashore acknowledges the scholarly status 
quo of thinking amongst other key theories as cited by several scholarly topics on 
privatization, and other forms of governance, with respect to state and private actors’ inter-
relationships (for example Cutler, Haufler & Porter, 1999; Clapp, 1998). Cashore advances 
NSMD as a best-fit framework to better conceptualize the role of certification schemes as 
private governance authorities. The NSMD governance approach sees market transactions 
and the participation of external partners and actors as the location and/or source of key 
authorities, while the government is seen in the process as owners of the resources with a 
specific interest or agenda. Arguably, within such a context, NSMD governance provides 
room for a more diverse and shared decision-making processes rather than monopoly or 
dominant rule by a single actor (the government in this case).  
The NSMD governance approach conceptualizes certification more of a mechanism that 
technically aims at influencing consumers’ decision or preferences through well-
coordinated and controlled market structures, especially within the case of the FSC 
(Bernstein and Cashore, 2000). In such a system, NGOs seems to provide more of the rules 
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or standards that define the operationalization of a given production and marketing system 
as the case may be (in forestry, fisheries, agri-food) with the overall advocation for better 
management structures and improved sustainability of the resource. Although 
conceptualized as market-based, such a system categorically exposes industrial actors to 
government presence and motivation for such these activities in terms of decision making 
and the adoption of better management options.   
To better provide a more grounded and exploratory explanation of the NSMD approach, 
the FSC is used by Cashore to explain the role and involvement of varying actors through 
market-driven policies and instruments for better governance. Through this NSMD 
approach, the state role is seemingly static and kept to the level of law or rule-enforcers 
rather than those developing policies, while the market through the buyers has a more active 
role in influencing the demand and the functionality of the system. Cashore (2002) 
characterizes NSMD governance as follows:  
1) “Role of the market - Purchasers, and retailers regulating and controlling the 
demand of products along the supply chain,  
2) Role of the state - State does not use its sovereign authority to directly commit 
to the rules been decided upon,  
3) Roles of stakeholders and civil society - Authority is granted through an internal 
evaluative process and  
4) Enforcement – Compliance by all concern must be verified” (p.509).  
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Though transnational NGOs play a very pivotal role in the process, participating 
stakeholders or members of the civil society have the authority and say in the overall 
process and its validity. The kind of stakeholders’ involvement usually excludes 
government, which in the development of the theory was influenced by the exclusion of 
government membership by the FSC;  
“… no popular elections do exist under NSMD systems, and no one can be 
incarcerated or fined for failing to comply. In the case of the FSC NSMD 
governance system, for example, governments are expressly forbidden from 
being members or voting in decision-making processes” (Cashore 2002, 
p.510). 
From this, it is evidential that, though states have the sovereignty and the ownership and 
management of their resources (forestry for example), the decision-making process is more 
shared amongst the participating actors.  Participating actors are considered as interest 
groups within NSMD and they work collaboratively to some extent in achieving their 
specific objectives which in most cases excludes government influence. Cashore’s NSMD 
suggestively did not provide a strong insight of the interactions between these multiple 
actors (private actors, governments or NGOs), though later publications provide more 
insight into this kind of interactions with these private authorities (Eberlein et al., 2014). 
The NSMD governance approach is insightful as it empirically provides an understanding 
of the specific role these actors play in certification as new environmental governance 
interventions. Conceptualizing the legitimacy of stakeholders’ presence without much 
government influence through transparent and conducive interaction and collaboration of 
actors during policy-making processes is an important contribution to this approach.   
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3.2.4 Vertical differentiation of third-party certification standards 
In this approach developed by Bush & Oosterveer (2015), the authors conceptualize the 
case of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC minus) for fisheries seeking or not yet able 
to meet standards to certification set by the MSC and include FIPs in their analysis.  FIPs 
are generally NGO-led and receive more support and attention from the private sector, 
providing a general shift and new challenges in the governance system and global market 
influence for such fisheries. With such a scenario, Bush & Oosterveer posit changes in the 
governance and credibility of the certification process with respect to the variation of 
actors’ participation or involvement within the FIP process (that is, the type of actors 
present within these processes plays a very important and relevant role to the attainment of 
its overall objectives). This claim is congruent with arguments by Marsden (2004) on the 
political economy challenges for standards and the quest for quality within the agri-food 
value chain networks through multi-stakeholders engagements and participation. 
Theoretically, several scholars have raised issues of power, such as the power of privately-
led governance institutions in relation to the overall governance and management of 
fisheries (See for example Bush et al., 2014; Ponte & Sturgeon, 2013). Certification 
standards over the years have witnessed a drastic shift from the usual state-centric or 
government dominated governance systems to privately influenced governance systems 
(Lemos & Agrawal, 2006). Vertical differentiation in this context is envisioned to provide 
an analysis of how various participants comply with the set certification standards, both 
those already certified and those seeking certification (Tlusty, 2012). Vertical 
differentiation posits challenges that arise from the participation of transnational NGOs, 
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comparing their private governance structure with those of domestic governments all with 
the objective of improving the fishery towards specific objectives. Congruent with Bush 
and his colleagues (Bush et al., 2014), vertically differentiation can be conceptualized as 
either internal or externally-led by actors or agents separately from the certification bodies, 
and in most cases from a combination of multiple actors, sponsors or even NGOs. This 
plethora of actors raises questions of power and the influence participating actors could 
have in certification processes or the quality of improvements done to meet the standards, 
thus conceptualizing the case of FIPs as a good example. 
There has been a pragmatic change in the governance structure within the global economy 
as Bush et al, articulates through the Global Value Chains (GVC) concept. In this literature, 
GVC refers to a more industry or firm rule in the governance process from a more diverse 
or vertical approach. Contrasted with state-centric forms of governance, GVC creates room 
and accommodates a diverse group of participants or actors’ participation, with each 
carrying out different activities in the chains with more coordination from lead-firms or 
institutions (Gereffi, Humphrey & Sturgeon, 2005). This shift in the governance structure 
definitely influences the functionality of the global international market or standard 
networks (Gibbon, 2008).  Amongst scholars (Yeung & Coe, 2015; Ponte & Sturgeon, 
2013), issues of interactions between various actors in the value chain that are “firm and 
non-firm actors” definitely raises questions and debates within the GVC governance 
system. Special interest for the purposes of this thesis lies in the manner in which these 
externally-led non-firm actors operate within these  processes. Strengths of the GVC 
governance model include how it can reveal “… the dynamism intersection between the 
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structural dimensions of regulation and the strategic behavior of firms to gain and maintain 
access to markets” (Bush & Oosterveer, 2015, p. 1864). 
Generally, the inclusion of external actors within certification standards as most scholars 
posit, creates a very complex and ambiguous scenario. Such scenarios include a situation 
in which sustainable improvements could be better achieved if the improvement process 
creates a provision for the inclusion of external actors, thereby undermining the benefits or 
mitigating the risk it could achieve from their participation and to the credibility of the 
standard to the wider public. Alternatively, the second situation is one in which these 
external actors are included but their involvement instead weakens the standard from their 
varying forms of influence. So, as Bush et al., 2014, posits there are still general questions 
as to how vertical differentiation within standards and the governance system seeks to 
promote the credibility or operationalization of the standard from these actors’ involvement 
since the entrance of new actors to these processes creates new governance structures, 
initiatives, and dynamics. Thus, their legitimation and credibility to some extent are 
questionable to the attainment of the improvement objectives and motivations.. 
3.3 Political Economy (PE) of Fishery certification and its governance approach 
3.3.1 Political Economy and Environmental Governance  
Veseth & Balaam (2014), defines Political Economy (PE) as:  
“a branch of social science that studies the relationships between individuals 
and society and between market and the state, using a diverse set of tools and 
methods have drawn largely from economics, political science, and sociology” 
(para.1).  
61 
 
PE is an interdisciplinary approach that uses various economic and political science 
theories to explain global and international problems such as those of the environment. PE 
gives a broader view in which social science issues can be analyzed within a clearer 
theoretical context. It provides an interactive platform for overarching discussions and 
empirical analysis of system functionalities and operations with those between actors and 
resource management. The application of PE in analyzing environmental problems/issues 
have been instrumental and geared towards solving environmental problems especially 
with a plethora of actors’ involvement and interactions in these processes (Oscar Alfranca 
in Martin and Nissan, 2010). Newell (2008) posits the need to rethink the challenges and 
barriers within power structures and regimes in environmental governance globally 
considering the type of actors or players involved. Newell elaborates the need to position 
the political economy and global environmental politics of governance in a manner that 
shows relationships between and relative power among state, market, and civil society 
actors in global environmental governance institutions such as eco-certification programs. 
One strength of the PE approach is how it can account for power dynamics across borders 
through international regimes and agreements (Gray & Hatchard, 2007). For example, 
international agencies, NGOs, foreign aids/donor programs have historically sought to 
revitalize the fisheries sector of Africa from its traditional system to a more entrepreneurial 
and commercial system through various forms of assistance such as improved fishing 
technologies and capacity-building efforts (Worm et al., 2006; Bailey, 1988). Using the 
political economy lens to assess the overall governance and decision-making processes 
within regional fisheries, Bailey shows how international agencies and the state benefits 
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more at the expense of small-scale fishers who remained marginalized (Bailey, 1988), thus 
reminding analysts to be aware of potential negative social development consequences of 
well-intentioned international environmental governance interventions such as FIPs. 
The rise of eco-certifications as an environmental policy tool has similarly been analyzed 
from a power-centric perspective within an international context.  While Newell outlines 
differences between the state and market in environmental governance, with market actors 
having significant power, he does not analyze actual producers influence in the process 
(Newell, 2008). This goes to support observations of Strange (1996) who addressed issues 
relating to the transfer of power of resource control from the state to the markets within the 
neo-liberal era. These dynamics in the management of these resources with a powerful 
market influence arguably exist with the rise of market-oriented processes such as eco-
certification. Acknowledging the role of state authorities and various other market and civil 
society stakeholders in global environmental politics, political economy emphasizes the 
need for understanding power dynamism between states, markets, and the society to 
achieve environmental governance objectives (Newell, 2008). 
Though the use of PE within this context of environmental governance seemingly looks 
promising Ponte (2008) argues PE’s functionality using the case of fisheries certification 
to show how despite the implementation of sustainability certification standards through 
market forces, not all parties are benefiting, especially small-scale producers. And small-
scale fishers in Africa are no exception. Though many of these certification bodies are 
aware of the challenges facing and the marginalization of small-scale fishers (Ponte, 2008), 
the intervention of international agencies, NGOs, and foreign governments aid can cause 
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more power imbalance within specific fisheries. Many bodies such as those in the European 
Union still strongly encourage and support the proliferation of the eco-label initiatives in 
the African contexts.  But the issue of power shift from the state to private authorities or 
transnational NGOs, who in some situations have more power than even the state in terms 
of decision-making, remains a major challenge for some governments who have 
protectionist behavior towards the management of the resource (Ponte, 2008; Gulbrandsen, 
2006).  Bartley et al., see these non-state certification bodies such as the MSC within the 
context of global environmental governance with their product eco-labeling tool, to be more 
of a regulatory and market-oriented policy option, benefitting mostly business promoters 
rather than the actual producers or communities (Bartley, Koos, & Samel, 2015).  Though 
the MSC has been very instrumental in pushing governments and fisheries towards 
certification and sustainable use, the involvement of various stakeholders is not well 
understood, particularly for those in developing nations who are experiencing and 
depending more of an externally-led system as international NGOs or foundation funding 
(Ponte, 2008). 
Undoubtedly, NGO financial and technical assistance has gone a long way to help improve 
fisheries in Africa to some extent and help move those fisheries towards meeting MSC 
standards, but it is crucial to better understand their involvement over the management of 
the fishery and to analyze who actually benefits (individuals, organizations or industry) 
from the process. Theoretically, Foley (2012) argues that the role of fishery clients in MSC 
certification can provide the unique power of some stakeholders over others, especially 
non-state actors within certification programs/projects.  
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3.3.2 Insights PE analysis of transnational governance trends 
Over recent decades, efforts to advance better fishery management and governance options 
through a market-driven mechanism such as eco-certification have been analyzed as part 
of broad-based, multi-sector changes in the political economy of transnational governance 
(Foley & Hébert, 2013; Ponte 2012; Cutler, 2011). Bonanno & Constance (2008;1996) 
posits the growth of transnational governance through market-driven governance within 
the global seafood industry amongst other certification schemes and products as a fast-pace 
policy-driven system or approach towards a better management of fisheries. For wild-
caught fisheries, its management has witnessed the proliferation of several actors and 
agents ranging from private non-state, state-based institutions and non-governmental 
organizations. Foley (2017) similarly refers to alternative fisheries certifications as a new 
governance hybrid to address such environmental challenges. Although the MSC stands as 
a non-profit and non-state voluntary third-party certification body for such a fishery, its 
operationalization often involves interactions not only of private actors but also with 
governments (Foley, 2017). Their overarching argument centers around the type of 
interaction that does exist between these actors and how issues of power are managed or 
categorized in the process of decision making and who are the participating actors. Related 
to the involvement of governments, Gulbrandsen (2009) and many other scholars in the 
broader literature of eco-certification in other sectors (for example Vogel, 2010; Auld et 
al., 2009) have identified varying power struggles and contentions over the control of 
natural resources with a more proactive private actor such as those participating in the MSC 
or FSC and the respect of state authority and sovereignty.  
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Conceptualizing the scenario of transnational governance or a hybridized system between 
private actors, state-based agents amongst others, often raises issues of power struggle and 
debates in the management and control of the resource, with varying agendas and 
motivation of these participating actors in the process (Hatanaka & Busch, 2008). This type 
of governance structure of non-state and state interactions has been a grey area for fisheries 
management over the last decade (see for example Ponte & Daugbjerg, 2015; Konefal, 
2013; Gale & Haward, 2011; Mol, 2010). It is noteworthy that NGO-led hybrid governance 
structures? increasingly claim respect for state authority by simulating their operational 
standards to existing state policies and management procedures developed usually from 
internationally agreed standards (Gale & Haward 2011; Auld et al., 2009). 
As power imbalances and dynamism remain some obvious issues between these 
participating private and public actors or agents, different actors often have different 
agendas and objectives in their involvement and participation in the process as posited 
above. To provide a theoretical insight into motivations, roles, responsibilities, and 
influence of all participants, this thesis puts power at the center of analysis by integrating 
insights and conceptualization of transnational governance as a contested terrain of political 
economy. The following sections of the chapter advance theoretical discussions on the 
political economy of fisheries management within the African context with the following 
headings: political economy and environmental governance, the transnationality of 
fisheries governance in Africa, and the power hegemony and systematic shifts in fishery 
governance within the African context and a conclusion of the chapter.  
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3.3: Transnationality of Fishery Improvement Initiatives in Africa  
As advanced by Foley and Hébert (2013), the global or international market has been 
heavily influenced by the proliferation of several labeling schemes with diverse set 
standards, of which participants or new entrants must achieve to garner better market 
opportunities. Among these labels, the MSC has been the dominant player for sustainable 
fishing practices for wild-caught fisheries. Still, achieving the MSC label is very 
challenging especially considering its huge cost, lengthy processes, and requirements in 
meeting its set standards (Goyert, Sagarin & Annala, 2010). Despite these challenges, many 
fisheries are still striving to meet these standards and to acquire economic benefits from the 
market where applicable. For the initiation of FIPs, which aim at encouraging a multi-
stakeholder engagement within a fishery to help it achieve sustainability and where possible 
the MSC label, the type of stakeholder involvement in Africa is seemingly complex 
involving a diverse group of actors both locally and internationally.  
Comparatively within the growing trend and spread of FIP around the world, African 
fisheries are witnessing quite a diverse level of stakeholder participation and involvement 
as articulated above. Aside from producers’ organizations or association, most of the 
fisheries in developing countries like those in Africa have a very powerful external or 
international influence from development agencies, NGOs, funders and foreign countries 
or industries on the operationalization of their fishery activities (Ward & Phillips, 2008; 
Gulbrandsen, 2009).  
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From a political economy perspective, the creation of FIP depends on an understanding of 
‘who does what’ and for ‘what reason’ within the fishery. Is there a dichotomy in the 
objective and participation of the multiple stakeholders or are they working toward a 
common goal, in a manner that benefits all parties involved? Contextually, any given 
system with an interplay of various actors/stakeholders within production/trade systems 
(the market), institutions (state or non-state actors) and civil society (e.g. NGOs) will have 
issues of power-sharing and dynamism (Weingast, Barry, & Wittman, 2008). As Paterson 
et al. posited in their scholarship, the political economy analysis framework is an approach 
in conceptualizing governance structures and responsibilities of stakeholders within new 
environmental governance initiatives and interventions, which could be likened to the case 
of FIPs (See Paterson, Humphreys, & Pettiford, 2003). For instance, fisheries governance 
and improvement initiatives in the African region, as in many other areas (Bush & 
Oosterveer, 2015), are often led or coordinated by NGOs, private actors or external 
agencies with general objectives to support them meet sustainability challenges, market 
access and possibly meet MSC certification standards. In Africa for example, the Fishery 
Governance Project (FGP) for the whole region is sponsored by the European Union and 
coordinated by the Africa Union through the African Union Inter-African Bureau for 
Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) and NEPAD division and agency respectively (AU-IBAR, 
2015) and equally support FIPs initiatives in the region. Furthermore, as with most other 
FIPs in developing countries (Sampson et al., 2015), all prominent FIPs in Africa are 
supported by NGOs, partners or an international agency on a case by case basis, and in 
most instances are more engaging and proactive than the local governments or institutions 
(See the Gambian Sole FIP case).   
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The participation of these external agents or actors within these improvement projects 
raises the question of the kind of contentions and power differentiation owing to its 
contested transnational governance structure and actors’ engagements (Foley, 2013; Ponte, 
2012; Gray & Hatchard, 2007). The question in terms of what their motivation is, and 
influence with respect to decision making and policy transitions within the FIP processes 
and the inclusion of relevant stakeholders, especially the producers, remains understudied 
for FIPs in Africa. All these questions are embedded in the kind of collaborative 
relationships that do exists among all the participants (Hatanaka, 2010). However, some 
scholars see the participation of these NGOs, seafood movements, industries, partners and 
corporations’ as re-enforcing various types of management systems or structures (Bartley, 
2007; Swyngedouw, Page, & Kaika, 2002). Political economy analysis pulls our attention 
to the issue of power imbalances and struggles and the facts of different levels of influence 
and different interests. 
One of the central issues to understand is who applies for or manages the FIP. FIP 
guidelines are generally developed to simulate the standards set by the MSC and which the 
implicated fishery aims at achieving. But the key issue for the MSC as Foley (2012) posits 
is that the process requires a particular organization to act as the fishery client responsible 
for certification. Generally, the yardstick for improvement evaluation of a FIP progress is 
the MSC pre-assessment as a “Benchmarking Tracking Tool” as developed by the MSC 
(See elaborations by Bush & Oosterveer, 2015). But this MSC pre-assessment must be 
requested for by a client. Considering the African FIPs appear to involve many international 
or external actors, determining who is the lead organization responsible for the FIP is 
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important. This reiterates issues of power-sharing and influence in this kind of transnational 
system or structure to the overall management of the resources and, potentially, to who 
actually is the beneficiary to a certain level (see Ponte, 2008). External partners or private 
actors, in most cases, appear to provide the necessary financial support for the FIP, making 
them salient actors in the whole process. With such a scenario, international actors appear 
to be key drivers for most FIPs in Africa in terms of activities, and decision making amongst 
others while governments and even the producers are just dormant participants (see analysis 
in Chapters 4 and 5). 
3.4: Conclusion: Power Differences within FIPs in Africa 
As Bartley (2003) posited, the lack of capacity, infrastructures and unenthusiastic political 
will of governments in the management of natural resources, especially in developing 
countries, has created opportunities for NGOs to step in and address some of the 
governance challenges. These processes include fisheries, through what some call the rise 
of the sustainable seafood movement in which NGOs and market actors play leading roles 
(Konefal, 2013).  As elaborated above, FIPs are one such NGO-driven initiatives that aim 
at helping fisheries achieve sustainability and where possible MSC certification. FIPs 
generally create opportunities for new transnational actors or the proliferation of many 
private and non-state actors into the management of fishery activities rather than the 
government or its people (Bush & Oosterveer, 2015; Gray & Hatchard, 2007). The shift of 
management of a state-owned natural resource such as a fishery raises many questions of 
how legitimate it is for private actors is to be at the forefront rather than the state 
(Gulbrandsen, 2009; Perk &Tickell, 2007; Cashore, 2002). Ponte (2008) observed that 
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governments and fishery stakeholders from developing nations such as Africa, as a means 
to protect their resources, are always laggards in the adoption of some of these NGO driven 
alternatives. 
Evidence presented above and in Chapter 4 and 5 below illustrate the presence of a plethora 
of actors participating in FIPs, which includes NGOs (e.g.; WWF, Blue Ventures), 
international research institutions and funders (e.g.; World Bank, USAID, DFID), the MSC, 
governments, corporations, processors, and producers (e.g., fishing groups or associations). 
With such complex multiple actors and agents within the FIP process and initiatives, 
political economy perspectives would expect there to likely be power dynamics and 
multiple levels of actors and interactions from this collaboration. This claim is congruent 
with arguments of Foley (2013) as to what kind of relationships or interaction does exist 
between actors and agents and to who benefits from this type of transnational resource 
management mechanism. The African region is challenged not only with lack of good 
environmental stewardship, but also with lack of capacity, financial resources within its 
existing institutions, and often significantly depends on foreign or external support in 
achieving any global objective. This makes the region experience what I refer to as an 
international top-down rather than a national top-down FIP process, involving complex 
multiple actors, and ensuring varying responsibilities in most of its fishery governance or 
improvement activities. But as Vogel (2010) elaborates, the role of government is 
seemingly very important as they have the sovereign rights over their resource on behalf of 
its people, so any related fishery activities must be approved by the state. But then, as 
Konefal (2013) posits, the role of these NGOs has proven to be instrumental in the 
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management of fishery resources and reducing the rate of degradation Thus, in this context, 
how can we understand and explain the emergence and intervention of FIPs in the African 
context and what patterns of interactions can be identified are questions this thesis is 
directed upon. 
The following chapters categorize motivation, interest, and interactions amongst these FIP 
participants (private actors, the state, and producers -small-scale fishers) through an 
analysis that also identifies distinctions of power-sharing in the decision-making process. 
Acknowledging the numerous challenges of governments, the direct integration of 
participation of small-scale fishers through capacity enhancement is necessary as an 
upgrading strategy for fishers in the region to help shape the kind of power relationship that 
will exist depending on their roles (See Wentink, Raemaekers & Bush, 2017; Hellin et al., 
2009). But rarely does this assertion exist where small-scale producers are fully 
incorporated into these processes. In many cases, international actors capture full control 
of the resource and even the policies (Gary & Hatchard, 2007). Since the fishing industry 
in Africa is predominantly small-scale, many of its participants are illiterate (See Sampson 
et al., 2015) with little or no knowledge or understanding of the FIP processes, let alone 
the MSC standards. With such a scenario, conflict of interest issues could arise between the 
supporting partners, the government and the fishermen, an area many scholars are trying to 
dwell more into (see for example Vogel, 2010; Ponte, 2008; Foley 2013;2012). Ultimately, 
these supporting partners are aiming towards creating more market opportunities and 
sustainability based on the MSC standards and expectations for FIPs, while the fishermen 
or government are aiming toward better livelihoods and the sustainability of their resource. 
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Furthermore, Hatanaka & Busch, 2008 provide arguments that the assumed trickle-down 
effects of the market incentives or premiums of fisheries expected with fisheries in the MSC 
certification process don’t necessarily or clearly occur, especially for the immediate 
producers and fishers. 
FIPs guidelines are developed generally with a reflection of standards set by the MSC. The 
MSC, as with other eco-labeling schemes, often creates differences in terms of power and 
management of the resource (Gale & Haward, 2011; Auld & Gulbrandsen, 2010). 
Participation within FIPs of actors depends to a certain extent on their interest and as to 
what is their motivation.  Seafood industries, for example, often focus on getting the fishery 
to levels in which it can provide them more market opportunities and benefits, while 
assuming that will change the livelihood situation of the fishers and their families, while 
the fishers focus primarily on improving their livelihood (See Auld and Gulbrandsen, 
2010). But then, in certain situations, Bush and Belton (2011) argue that the participation 
of these actors in the management of the fishery, not only by the state, has gone a long way 
to help address issues such as fish stock depletion. Espousing the claims of Bush and 
Belton, Bush & Oosterveer (2015), more evidence is required on the role these 
governments, NGOs, and partners of FIPs with emphasis on what they are doing to support 
fisheries get better market access and achieving the MSC certification. Thus, it is important 
to examine the extent to which FIPs could act and provide an alternative and quicker 
channel to improvements and market access in certain fisheries as compared to other 
governance approaches. To help us understand the potential of FIPs, it is critical to examine 
actor motivation and interests, roles and responsibilities, and how these actors and interests 
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interact in developing country contexts often shaped by different power imbalances 
between global and local actors.  
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CHAPTER 4: FISHERY IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS IN AFRICA 
This chapter examines Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) initiatives within the broader 
African context. It employs the use of available literature and interviews with key 
informants in the region to provide an in-depth analysis of the current governance and 
management trends of FIPs in Africa. The chapter conceptualizes and provides 
commentaries on the involvement and participation of multiple actors, institutions, and 
partners collaborating and interacting in these improvement initiatives and fishery 
governance activities in the region. The chapter draws from selected FIPs in the region (see 
Table 4) to provide an empirical understanding of who are the participating actors, their 
roles or involvement in the FIP processes and policies, the interactions between these 
stakeholders and above all the challenges they go through in carrying out these activities 
within the African context.  
Many key governmental and non-governmental bodies promote the idea of a need to move 
Africa’s fisheries forward to meet sustainability goals and to improve its competitiveness 
in the market both domestically and internationally. Amongst other specifics country’s 
improvement initiatives, the African Union Commission (AUC), through its Department of 
Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA), are steadfast in achieving these global objectives. 
Within DREA, the African Union Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (AU-IBAR) 
as a special technical arm is coordinating an African region-wide Fishery Governance 
Project (FGP) with sponsorship from the European Union (AU-IBAR, 2015). AU-IBAR is 
a regional initiative with a coordinating structure, while the NEPAD (The New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development), through its Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), is 
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collaborating with various African countries government ministries, fishing organizations, 
non-state actors, and foreign partners such as the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DFID), and the MSC, to initiate and foster sustainable fishery activities and 
to help fisheries meet certification standards in the African region, especially through the 
FIPs. 
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Figure 3: An African map showing the country of origin of FIPs in Africa and their various 
levels. The map was done courtesy of the GIS expertise of Myron King. Environmental 
Policy Institute, MUN.  
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Table 4 shows various FIPs in Africa within the access of the research, the type of FIP and 
an elaborated list of key actors and agents participating in the process. 
Table 4. Fishery Improvement Projects in Africa5 
Country/Fishery FIP Level Actors/Agents Involve 
The Gambia - Sole Fishery Comprehensive • The National Sole Fishery 
Co-Management Committee 
(NASCOM) - FIP Lead 
• The Department of Fisheries 
of the Ministry of Fisheries, 
Water Resources and 
National Assembly Matters 
of The Gambia (DoFISH) 
• The Atlantic Seafood 
Company Ltd. 
• USAID Funded Gambia-
Senegal Sustainable 
Fisheries Project (USAID -
BaNafaa)6 
Morocco – Morocco Sardine Comprehensive • Jo Gascoigne (FIP Lead) 
• Ministry of Agriculture and 
Maritime fishery 
                                                          
5 There exists several minor and major fishery improvements and governance projects in Africa in various 
countries with different funders and supporters. But this research only listed the ones the research is 
knowledgeable about in the region and about which it could easily find documented materials.   
6 The USAID-BaNafaa project is being implemented through the Coastal Resources Center (CRC) of the 
University of Rhode Island (USA) and the World Wide Fund for Nature -West Africa Marine Program Office 
(WWF-WAMPO) amongst all the other actors (DeAlteris, Cessay & Jallow, 2012. p.3)  
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Mauritania -Mauritanian 
small pelagic 
Basic • Mauritanian Fishery 
Authority 
• Mauritanian Oceanographic 
and Fishery Research 
Institute 
• Local Businesses 
• International Fishmeal and 
oil Buyers 
Mauritania – Mauritania 
Octopus 
Basic/Prospective • Société Mauritanienne pour 
la Commercialisation de 
Poisson (SMCP SEM) 
• Key Traceability  
Madagascar – Southwest 
Madagascar Octopus Fishery 
Basic/Prospective • Blue Ventures – FIP Lead 
Mozambique – Deep- Water 
Shrimp Fishery 
Unclassified • WWF 
• National Administration for 
Fisheries (ADNAP) 
• National Institute for 
Fisheries Research (IIP) 
• Deep-water Shrimp Industry 
Kenya – Rock Lobster 
Fishery 
Unclassified • Kenya State Department of 
Fisheries 
• WWF 
• Rock Lobster Fishery 
Management Advisory 
Committee (RLFMAC) 
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• UK's DFID 
Tanzania – Octopus Fishery Unclassified • Lake Victoria Fish 
Processors Association of 
Tanzania (LVFPAT) 
• Ministry of Livestock and 
Fisheries Development of 
the United Republic of 
Tanzania. 
• WWF-Tanzania Country 
office and the WWF Coastal 
East Africa Initiative 
• UK's DFID 
Compiled by Author, 2018 
The various FIP levels as outlined above are explained in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Table 4 
shows a diversity in the various participating actors within each of these FIPs in Africa and 
the FIP leads ranging from NGOs, co-management bodies, government and research 
institutes engaged in the process. Though the research provides explanations on all these 
FIPs, the Gambia Sole fishery FIP was chosen as an empirical case study for the research 
to better conceptualize a FIP scenario in Africa (see Chapter 5).  
4.1: Participating Actors and Agents 
The initial conceptualization of FIPs was primarily done through guidelines by NGOs and 
related fishery consultancy institutions which created provisions for the participation of 
multiple stakeholders (WWF-US, 2013; Bush et al., 2013). The varying groups of actors 
usually (but not always) include at least: NGOs, industries (middlemen, processors, and 
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exporters), government agencies, fishing groups/association, researchers, supporting 
partners, international organizations and even Pan-African/regional institutions such as the 
African Union, collaborating to improve and make the fishery sustainable (Roheim, Asche 
& Insignares Santos, 2011). From the gleaned documentation of FIPs in the African region, 
an NGO representative accentuated to this by saying: 
‘… A typical stakeholder [group involved in a FIP] is government, industry, 
fisheries, market, NGO, scientist, researchers and so on and a key strength  of 
the MSC program is that it provides a framework for people to come together 
and then analyse the fishery and identify what the issues are and look at what 
has to be done for each of those entities to see actually their position in the 
action plan, and this falls within the remise of what I do or can assist’. (interview 
no. 11) 
 
This quotation presents a plethora of varying actors with a common interest, participating 
to support and improve fisheries in the African region through FIPs.  As Auld et al., (2015) 
posits in the context of MSC research, the objective of these actors is to improve the 
degradative nature of a fishery and its environment. They aim at enhancing the capacities 
and capabilities of local actors engaged in these activities regarding how to better carry out 
fisheries improvements through well-established development initiatives and work plans. 
There obviously exist contrary opinions to the purview and nature of actors’ involvement 
especially when the processes are being externally driven or internationally motivated (see 
Berkes, 2009). Still, despite such differences most would agree that a key benefit of such 
processes is that dialogue between stakeholders about how to better manage their fishery 
and achieve certification, is enhanced as a key outcome of such efforts. (Thórarinsson, 2017 
conference paper presentation). Africa, like most other developing world contexts, has 
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several participating actors in FIPs, who are working with stakeholders for better fishery 
improvement objectives and outcomes. Though there is a lot of international or external 
actors in the process, one of the interviewees highlights the presence and participation of 
local actors too, 
‘The members and representatives of the local or municipal authorities, then the 
fishermen themselves and some of the women who work at the processing 
industry to do the related activities. In some of the meetings, women were also 
represented, with the provincial staff as well., But they weren’t that interested 
in these activities. They might have come to meetings but not really interested. 
So basically, it was between local fishermen and authorities for each village’. 
(interview no. 12) 
This shows a broader spectrum of actors and how relevant actors are included in the 
process, but also different levels of engagement and interest. In general, the involvement 
of local authorities, fishers and the communities make the process more engaging and 
participatory. It creates a foundation for the quick and effective understanding of the 
challenges the fishery is facing and how to better prioritize the improvement options and 
work plan activities. Though there is a need for more meaningful stakeholder 
involvement, as the quote about women’s participation shows, how various 
representatives are chosen from these communities is also very important to the 
functionality of the FIP especially when knowledgeable and well-experienced members 
are desired. To ensure transparency and better participation of actors, an interviewee 
emphasized and explained some key issues which must be clearly identified when 
selecting and involving actors in the process: 
‘First, they need to make sure they include all the pertinent actors from the 
province and also all the people in each community or village whose livelihood 
come from the sea are included like the fishermen, middlemen and all the actors 
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like the fishery factories and actors. And from what I saw the fishermen were 
there, and some processors were present, and it will be nice to include all the 
stakeholder’. (interview no. 12) 
 
FIPs also go through a similar trend as certification processes, where participating actors 
and agents through constructive dialogue and discussions, create channels in which local 
networks can fully participate. As a participant said: ‘we work with the government, the 
African Union works with the government’ (interview no.13). As normally anticipated, 
local stakeholders have a key role in driving the FIP processes and governance activities, 
though the processes are mostly externally-led. The local actors own the resource and most 
of them depend on it fully for their livelihood which makes their participation very relevant 
and essential. Though FIPs are run by specific guidelines, the involvement of local 
stakeholders aids the whole improvement processes. This is supported by an interviewee 
explanation: 
‘It will really depend on the fishery and it varies on a case by case bases. For 
example, we had in the Gambia, there was a fisherman [name] who was very 
passionate and active, and he was driving all the process. He will organize the 
meetings and work with the experts and try to encourage them and so on. And 
then in another fishery, we had somebody who was an ex-fishery director and 
he was the one interested in trying to get resources for the fishery to move 
forward and encourage different meetings between universities, researchers, 
and government. So, it really varies on a case by case bases. (interview no. 11)  
An interesting aspect of FIP-related activities and governance in Africa is the dependent 
nature of these fisheries on an external body or foreign actor(s) and which highlights the 
‘political economy factor’ noted above regarding other certification research (Foley, 2017, 
p. 925). Though there might exist national or even local government management structures 
with available personnel, international actors definitely play a very important role in such 
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FIPs. These FIPs are therefore relatively externally led and transnational in nature with the 
interaction of both state and private authorities, with the latter generally more influential in 
the processes. Put more simply, international NGOs definitely have a strong presence in 
these fisheries in Africa. As a fishery consultant explained ‘…we mainly work for the 
WWF in the fisheries’ (interview no. 15). 
This statement outlining the strong presence of multiple international partners within these 
FIP settings was again supported by another consultant in the region. The consulted 
explained that they were “…always working together with WWF and the government as 
partners…and we are busy doing an octopus project now starting with one of the certifying 
bodies -Acoura and working with the MSC in Africa” (interview no. 14). 
Although many participants emphasized the key role or presence of these international 
partners in the FIPs in Africa, some also recounted the necessity of properly engaging or 
involving local and/or national government institutions if such FIPs are to work well. 
Relatedly, an NGO participant spoke clearly to this and noted how valuable it is to the 
overall process: “So, we work with the government but also with the fisheries groups in 
their small management structure, also with the extension of fishers from the governments 
and the middlemen and with all the actors in the value chain” (interview no.15). Another 
NGO representative reflected on a similar process by saying “…we work with the fishing 
communities” (interview no. 16). 
The dependent nature of these African fisheries and their FIPs could always be challenged 
if the set fishery has put in place good management systems that clearly breaks down the 
method of operations and stipulates the role and duties of each of the participating actors. 
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The manner in which producers, the industry, and government officials participate in FIPs, 
often affects the quality of improvement the fishery receives. In most cases, better 
stakeholder participation in a FIP leads to a more effective FIP overall. An NGO official 
explained how they operate with existing or well-established systems and those they 
considered as relevant stakeholders for efficient activities within the fishery: 
‘Then at the regional level, we have the CGP - The Octopus management 
committee which groups all the regional stakeholders and that includes people 
like us, the NGOs sector, University, professors, public-private sectors like the 
collectors; we are working with exporters and collectors’ (interview no. 16).  
In some cases, to ensure legitimacy and proper power-sharing among participating actors, 
elections are usually carried out to elect officials who will run or lead the FIP. Most of those 
elected to these positions are usually from the local communities to ensure their full 
engagement in the process and their commitment. As a consultant explained: 
‘There is also this CGP where we  meet and we have a representative from the 
Ministry of Fishery, and there we elect fishery representatives and they will be 
in charge of representing the whole village at meetings’. (interview no.16) 
As a key remark to participating actors within various FIPs in Africa, though there are 
various NGOs and donors related support fishery programs in the region, there also exists 
an umbrella institution that supports and promotes the enhancement of fishing activities in 
the region. The African Union (AU) through its specialized technical unit of the Department 
of Rural Economy and Agriculture and the African Union InterAfrican Bureau for Animal 
Resources (AU-IBAR) leads and coordinates the Fishery Governance Project that supports 
FIPs in the region. A participant explained how the various actors collaborate and support 
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these activities through continental think tanks and the formulation of comprehensive 
policies to address key issues: 
‘The FGP is implemented by AU-IBAR in partnership with NEPAD-NPCA. 
But AU-IBAR is the lead implementing agency. So, one of the activities has to 
do with access to market and a sub-activity under that is on enhancing 
certification programs including those executed by MSC and ECO mark-
African brand in certification...In executing that task, we collaborated with 
NEPAD and MSC. . It hasn’t really been completed, we just did one aspect of 
it. So that’s the background to that’. (interview no. 13) 
Within the context of fishery governance and policy formulation in the region, non-state 
actors have received recognition for their relevance and the role they seek to provide in 
advancing fishery activities. The AU-IBAR has over the years supported and organized 
non-state actors from the East African region, which consist of 12-member states, into 
regional platforms for those who have equally benefited from capacity building programs 
and key policy issues in the region such as FIPs (Kamuturaki, 2018, Workshop Paper 
Presentation). 
Therefore, FIPs in Africa, like some in developed countries, have powerful external 
partners and donors, who collaborate with local stakeholders to enhance and strengthen 
improvement initiatives in the region. Local actor representation within the FIP policy 
formulation and work plan development processes are recognized and their experience and 
local knowledge is considered needed for the smooth functioning of FIPs. The participation 
of this ‘basket of actors’ is seemingly very laudable for the region as it brings in a 
multiplicity of ideas and participants with different expertise and fishery knowledge which 
aids the improvement of the fisheries towards the required sustainability standards. 
86 
 
4.2:  Financing 
Fisheries in Africa are predominantly artisanal or small-scale which naturally makes them 
disadvantaged in terms of competitive market access. They are further disadvantaged as 
they have limited financial resources as compared to larger and more subsidized industrial 
fisheries (Nunan, 2014; Ponte et al., 2007). Tweddle et al., (2015) posits how African 
fisheries, like most other developing nations, are benefiting from the proliferation of 
support programs provided by international bodies together with local and/or regional 
networks. This is often accomplished through public-private partnerships with international 
organizations, NGOs and even support from some charitable foundations. As a participant 
mentioned “…yeah, all the money came from WWF” (interview no. 12). Funding for most 
of the FIP or related fishery activities in Africa is seldom government which in most cases 
usually have very little financial resources to support improvement initiatives (Allison et 
al., 2012). One interviewee explains: 
‘Is very very seldom government, they might be different in some developed 
countries like in places like Australia they have applied the MSC standard 
across broad areas and in some cases the government will put money into it 
whether or not they call it a FIP. Here is very very seldom government. The 
government doesn’t really do much. The fisheries don’t have a lot of money for 
stock assessment or improvement etc. Generally, it could come from donors 
and there are donors who are interested in the work in Africa. You got the World 
Bank, GIZ, and in the case of the Gambia sole, one of the retailers was 
interested in supporting the fishery. So, it comes from multiple sources and less 
often from government’ (interview no. 10) 
Institutions in Africa be they local, national or regional groups working with FIPs or fishery 
governance initiatives do not in most cases have the capability to independently carry out 
some of these activities to support their FIP process. They often depend on and receive 
87 
 
financial support from major donors such as the European Union. An AU official 
explained: ‘The funding is from the European Union. The EU is funding what we call the 
Fisheries Governance Project in Africa’. (Interview no. 13). If a salient institution such as 
the AU technical department receives funding for its own activities, this alone goes a long 
way to show how dependent the region is to external support for any of such fisheries 
initiatives. The context to meet financial capabilities, especially for fisheries 
improvements, is a very challenging issue for the region. The challenges are enormous as 
an NGO official explained: 
‘… and the justification is that we are dealing with a very difficult situation not 
just in Africa but most developing countries where there is not enough money. 
Most of these fisheries are operating on a narrow margin, the fishermen 
themselves don’t have the capacity to fund pre-assessment or certification, so 
is very easy for us to say we got this market mechanism and you will benefit 
from it in the long term. You know the accessibility issues are just not there, 
there is no funding, they don’t have the existing market, so we use those to 
engage with them, the potential funders and just by doing the pre-assessment it 
gives us something to work with and we can say this is what the fishery needs 
to improve on and we can approach funders to get more support’(interview no. 
10). 
To consolidate the global trend of ensuring the sustainability of fisheries through impactful 
improvements and possibly ecolabelling, there have been supportive efforts from various 
partners, through the enhancement and support of local networks in Africa. Fisheries in 
Africa are receiving enormous support from international partners as a participant outlined: 
‘Mainly from external funders and donors. From the EU, from World Bank, sometimes is 
WWF who is also our client but normally the money is coming from international donors’ 
(Interview no. 15). Aside from these names mentioned, there are other serious funders 
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supporting FIP activities in Africa in which another similar participant tried to outline. The 
interview participant suggested that funders included:  
‘…GIZ, they are the one funding the octopus at the moment, the Dutch postcode 
lottery card that works mostly for the developing world. They are funding the 
South Africa inshore pre-assessment …[The] World bank funds a lot of projects 
in South Africa. Looking at countries, we have German, Norway, Dutch etc..’ 
(Interview no. 10). 
Although one cannot argue the putative nature of these external supporters or actors to the 
development and improvement of these fisheries, it raises the question on the transparency 
and the influence they have on the fishery since they are providing the majority of the 
funding for these activities. Each of the funders generally has their own agenda and mode 
of operations as an interviewee mentioned: ‘…All these initiatives are facing this imbalance 
because the funding is all external from donors. Can’t really talk more about how much 
each donor gave. They were many agencies from Asia, World Bank, USAID, the Japanese 
development institute’ (Interview no. 12). Another participant similarly supported the 
contention of the reliance on international sources of funding for the functionality of these 
FIP initiatives. A participant said: 
‘The Kenya red rock lobster and the Tanzania octopus are the ones we have 
been closely involved and the delivery partner is WWF-East Africa and when 
it comes down to the actual project implementation and making improvements 
it often comes to funding’ (interview no. 10). 
With respect to financing generally, like FIPs within the African context, interview 
participants suggested that governments invest little to support the improvement of 
fisheries. Most of the support is from other sources or goodwill organizations especially 
NGOs who support fishery improvements and certification activities. Donors, especially 
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NGOs (for example, the WWF has solely sponsored some FIPs) play a very pivotal role in 
almost all improvement projects in the area as a fishery consultant explained: 
‘There was very little money from the government in all these projects aright... 
All the money came from WWF. So of the projects and this is indirectly co-
funded by the World Bank project. The World Bank was partly involved in 
providing some funding, for example, the octopus fishery in Tanzania and the 
lobster fishery in Kenya. So, that World Bank project although they did not 
directly fund them, they provided institutional support. And there was similar 
stuff in Mozambique co-funded by the state. I cannot state exactly who 
sponsored but I know there were some activities that were co-funded and that 
was conditional that the state authorities with providing some support for that’. 
(Interview no. 14) 
Governments in most African cases do not have the financial capabilities to carry out most 
of its fishery improvement activities. A participant emphasized the point that the fishers 
themselves in some contexts are very viable and could play a very important role in 
financing some of these initiatives if given the opportunity. The participant explained: ‘yes, 
they don’t ask for help, they are independent people […] fishers have their own agenda, 
with the fund or no fund, but they can collaborate with other agencies if needed’ (interview 
no. 1). So, full involvement of these fishers might help support the government in several 
ways. 
Relatedly, a fishery consultant explained: 
‘I mean Senegal is not one of the worst countries in Africa but it also has budget 
issues from the central government who can’t reach out to every fishery 
community etc, and provide them with the support they need. So I think more 
than anything now favors the economically wise, the way of setting up co-
management initiatives through international donor funding was a way for the 
central government to relieve itself from this task’ (interview no. 12). 
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This discussion provides stronger evidence to the view that though there exists both local 
and national institutions supporting these FIPs, international actors and partner agencies 
powerfully support these fisheries in achieving sustainability and where possible applying 
for certification through huge financial commitments. This obviously raises questions of 
who leads or controls the activities of the FIP (the sponsors, the government or the fishers 
themselves). However, a participant argued that funders usually do not influence the 
activities developed for the fisheries and explained: ‘If you are even talking by policy, the 
continental policy was formulated through what we call the implementation of the African 
fisheries reform mechanism AFR, that even came up before the fishery governance project. 
So, the FGP is implementing the principle and objectives of the continental policy’ 
(interview no.13). 
Based on this research, FIPs in Africa usually receive more than 90% financial support 
from an external partner or donor agencies. Governments are quite dormant and less 
responsive in terms of financial investments in these activities. Local industries contribute 
more on the human resources end than the financial portion of it. There is over-dependency 
within the region for international support which is quite challenging as funding sources 
can never be guaranteed, and governments keep changing as do funding priorities. So, 
governments, local industries, and stakeholders are often limited to committing financially 
in a co-finance system for the smooth running of these FIPs. 
4.3: Institutional Collaborations, Motivations and Interactions 
The two latter sections above clearly show a broad spectrum of actors participating within 
FIPs in Africa, as well as the various funding sources or financial support available from 
91 
 
promoters supporting such initiatives in the region. FIPs in Africa, in general, are more 
externally-led through NGOs or internationally supported organizations like most eco-
certification programs. As Eberlien et al., (2014) argues, the participation of these diverse 
groups of actors and agents creates a shift in the management system of natural resources 
not only by government but also with the involvement of private non-state actors in leading 
emerging initiatives. With such a situation of multiple actors’ involvement, scholars within 
these realms argue that this situation typically creates issues of power-sharing and 
dynamism between all participants (Vogel, 2010; Auld et al., 2009). The identification and 
engagement of relevant institutions and stakeholders from the very beginning are important 
as an international NGO official explained:  
‘The whole MSC is built around stakeholders, so our engagement normally 
starts right at the beginning, trying to bring in the fisheries themselves, at least 
fishery representatives who represent fishers interest in the stakeholders or 
committees. It is a supply chain we have the committee, funders, and NGO, 
together to start the process’ (interview no. 10). 
With the more externally sponsored FIPs in Africa, it is very difficult to clearly characterize 
how they all collaborate and who takes the lead in these improvement processes. An 
international NGO participant raises issues of the interactions and involvement of these 
external partners with the local stakeholders. The participating NGOs or external partners 
as the case might be, understand the need to involve and interact with the people for better 
results, though they might be bringing in almost all the funding. A similar participant 
agreeing with this notion explained:  
‘So is through consultation and collaboration rather than someone coming from 
the US and say this is the action plan, go and do this. Most FIP has the role to 
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develop an action plan, the cost, the time frame etc so there must be that 
consultation’ (interview no.11).  
This collaboration and interactions within these various processes can be strengthened and 
more proactive if regional bodies such as the leading technical arm of the AU have more 
rigorous and well-coordinated systems that ease transition and interactions with external 
partners and member states. Good interactions between all participating actors, be it local, 
national, regional or international, are highly encouraged as another participant explained: 
‘I think AU can be a voice to support this and engage and help governments in 
the right direction. Yeah, I will say identifying where the main needs are, we 
feel that the resources need to be direct in Africa, but the individual government 
has ideas on that in terms of their own needs and of course getting the other 
stakeholders through NGO and supply chain’ (interview no. 10). 
To better consolidate the functionality of these management structures through the 
existence of stronger local or national bodies such as the Octopus Improvement Project in 
Madagascar, another participant explained: 
‘So, on the ground, these are the people we directly work with, but we also have 
a regional platform called the octopus management committee [CGP] and is a 
regional platform that includes all the stakeholders in the octopus fishery here. 
So, this is sort of the platform we use to validate any decision we asked on the 
fishery and how we validate the FIP’ (interview no.16). 
Though Hatanaka & Busch, (2008) provide an empirical discourse on issues of self-interest 
and power struggles that often come up between varying actors within certification 
processes in other agri-food sectors.  The manner in which these institutions collaborate 
amongst themselves goes a long way to explain the success of such initiatives and 
underpins some of the transparency and all-inclusive nature of the fishery governance 
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processes amongst all participants. An AU official explained how the Fishery Governance 
project operates and includes all relevant actors: 
‘First of all, we train their capacity in December 2015 as part of that sub activity. 
We trained  responsible officers in these areas, and creating awareness, about  
certification. Member states, particular who have things to do related to 
certification, we invited them to the workshop in Yaoundé as you can see on 
our website. We requested for nominations, one from the directors of fisheries 
and the technical staffs who are involved in these areas from selected AU 
members from coastal areas and those who have issues related to the 
certification program. I remember the Gambia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Kenya 
etc. That training was executed with MSC and ARSO. They were all part of the 
training program’ (interview no.13). 
But as Bush & Oosterveer (2015) explain, the various objectives of these actors, and the 
genuine motivation of every participant, are key to the process. Every actor must be very 
proactive along the chain of activities if they desire any improvements or enhancement of 
their fishery rather than been pulled along. A participant explained: ‘But again, there is also 
demand driven as I mentioned. I don’t want to say it is there or not or is automatic. When 
member states make a request, it goes through management and, management takes a 
decision and depending on the availability and if is in line with the mandate of the 
organization’ (interview no.12). This explains to some extent the perspectives and approach 
used by the African Union on how it goes about its comprehensive policy formulation 
strategies and processes in the African region. Complex multiple actors’ interaction within 
any given context of FIPs in Africa can create contentious governance issues as Foley 
(2013) advances as for the case of the MSC certification process more generally. Within 
the various FIP cases or fishery governance processes in the region, there are usually 
variations with approaches and the implementation of continentally agreed policies with 
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those of member states government fishery departments, though it could be in line with 
some of them. Again Hatanaka (2010) posits the need for collaboration or good 
relationships and interactions between participating actors as an essential aspect of the 
functionality of an interactive process among actors. These kinds of fruitful relationships 
are mostly encouraged (at times through the formation of associations to manage the FIP) 
between FIPs in Africa despite their challenges. As a fishery consultant in the region 
explained: 
‘… in Mozambique, the FIPs was developed with all 3 parties. They will 
develop with my support as the consultant who was helping and drafting the 
developing plans. It was sponsored primarily by WWF and then the participant 
in developing of the FIP. It was completely transparent. We had the 
government, the research, and the industry. So, the industry is like “okay, we 
will sit there and help provide information.” But generally, the industry wasn’t 
that supportive by providing funds. In Mozambique, we formed an association 
with an MOU with the industry so that they agree on the process that was going 
to be followed’ (interview no. 14). 
This quote illustrates a very good practical scenario in which relevant actors through these 
associations and MOU’s are given the right to participate and be part of the FIP process 
despite their own drawbacks in terms of financing. Funders generally provide room for 
stakeholders to be part of the policy formulation process without any fixed agenda, though 
one can argue that the whole FIP process is quite defined and clear with a generally fixed 
agenda (i.e., improving the sustainability of fisheries to standards set by the MSC). As in 
the case of the EU funded FGP, the policy formulation processes are laid out by 
representatives from African Union Member States (AU-MS) without any external 
influence. Though the project’s protocols and procedures were approved by the EU before 
granting the funds, local internal institutions within Africa and other international bodies 
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working in the region (the FAO for example) are the key players and participants during 
meetings or workshops that seek to advance better fisheries governance in the region. 
Emphasizing the trend toward greater and better collaboration within existing institutions 
and actors, a similar participant explained: 
‘There was engagement okay, so in the workshops, we will engage with the 
relevant people and the parties and in Tanzania, they will bring in people from 
the beach management unit depending on the particular circumstances and in 
that way, we shall always have some community engagement’ (interview no. 
14). 
The role of these participating institutions cannot be overemphasized as they occupy a very 
vital position in the development of comprehensive fishery policies in the African region. 
The coming together and collaboration between these stakeholders from private 
institutions, governments, and international partners have proven to result in better planning 
and running of these FIPs. This is evidential on the continent as an AU official explained: 
‘It has this architecture where it drives from the working group stakeholders 
through a think tank meeting. So, we usually consult action and decision and 
policies in these regards is always consultative, participatory in delivery’. 
(interview no. 13). 
4.4 Government Responses and Dynamics to FIPs Initiatives 
Within AU-IBAR, governments of member states through their various fisheries 
departments represent and play a vital role in the formulation of comprehensive strategies 
to move fisheries and aquaculture ahead in the region. The initiation of activities depends 
in most cases on local regional body action plans, work plans of specific countries, and how 
stakeholders, especially governments, are engaged in the process. This is especially the 
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case within the framework of the Fishery Governance Projects ongoing in the region. 
Governments’ involvement in supporting the improvement of fisheries through initiatives 
such as FIPs is quite limited in the region. Indeed, as illustrated below by a fishery 
consultant participant, concerns about the degree to which governments can and do support 
and promote collaboration, and help to create better institutions that can better serve the 
people overall, can result in situations where the activities are more internationally- led 
rather than nationally-led:  
‘It is very tricky right, the thing is, initially co-management fishery project in 
Senegal were set up through the pressure of private international donors like 
World Bank, USAID. It doesn’t look as if the Senegalese central government 
was keen on it as in the beginning, so it was more of external international 
pressure, because I think Senegal is like a very highly centralized government 
…’ (interview no. 12). 
The issue appears to be that with such a scenario, activities which are supposed to be 
government-led are being transferred to other authorities, mostly international in nature as 
in most fisheries improvement initiatives in the region. Though the legitimacy and position 
of government cannot be compromised or minimized, they do not actually play a significant 
role in decision-making processes, but rather act as policy enforcers.  As Foley (2017) 
recounts, the pressure mounted by these external partners goes a long way to explain why 
local actors, such as government authorities, sometimes question the political legitimacy of 
such FIP processes and this can affect the support they offer to the whole process especially 
with stakeholders’ involvement. This categorically reflects on the FIP situation in the 
African continent where NGOs and other private authorities are key players in leading these 
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governance processes. They provide not only financial support but also technical support 
and research activities which makes their presence and participation more unique and 
important. Therefore, interactions amongst these participants in terms of decision-making 
and the power of the state cannot be of equal strength like those between and among the 
external partners and NGOs. 
Gulbrandsen (2009) also raises concerns about how legitimate this type of management 
system can be with a shift from state control to more of an international or externally-
controlled system. Though as Ponte (2008) explains the external pressure always comes in 
as the governments or the people of Africa are often very slow in the adoption of new 
technologies or governance initiatives, but rather rely on international support. 
Similarly, a fishery consultant interviewed explained the lack of enthusiasm or efforts on 
behalf of a government in terms of promoting such activities through proper interactions 
with other institutions (interview no. 12). 
Furthermore, interactions between actors are at times limited due to the motivation, 
especially of government actors, to participate fully in the process. As a participant noticed 
and explained: ‘Number one for me is government wanting to make improvements, if the 
governments want to, the FIPs can move ahead. The biggest trouble is to get people in 
government to come to the meeting since they are the one that mostly makes the decision 
and enforcement’ (interview no. 10). This suggests that governments, even if reluctant and 
with limited capacity, are valuable participants in FIPs.  
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In a nutshell, there do exist positive trends in terms of interactions and collaborations 
between the participating actors within FIPs in Africa, at least in most of the cases. Though 
primarily externally-led, local stakeholders participate in the decision-making processes 
and in the development of FIP action plans. Governments, through related departments, are 
usually given provision for involvement during the chain of activities for the FIP. But how 
these collaborations work out in practice depends in large part on the existing institutions 
and governance structures for fisheries in that country and the interest of the government 
in supporting such initiatives. The country’s governance system plays a key role in this 
context. For instance, countries having a more centralized government system influences 
the process and interact differently from those with strong local, regional or provincial 
government structures who in some cases have the authority and capacity to carry out 
activities which will directly benefit the people without needing to get approval from the 
central government. This is evident (discussed in detail in the next chapter) with the 
Gambian case where LASCOM was pivotal in gathering information and controlling 
activities at the local level and reporting to NASCOM. Thus, these structures influence how 
some countries can be more or less flexible in and better at adapting and collaborating with 
external partners than some others. Most of the FIPs do have strong international 
participation depending on the willingness of the country and the motivation of the people 
championing these activities as highlighted earlier. A country such as the Gambia with a 
co-management system allows provisions for the independent committed members of 
NASCOM to seek and lobby for support from any partner (mostly international actors) they 
deem important with or without government approval. Gambia procedures also encourage 
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interactions between all actors within the chain from top to bottom as compared to more 
limited interactions in settings with centralized government systems. 
As a participant explained, they went down to communities and interacted with the people 
to understand their needs and this seemingly shifted power from government to non-state 
actors as Gulbrandsen (2009) posited. The participant highlighted:  
‘We went the first thing we did in our first trip is we went around to try and 
understand the fisheries, we knew nothing, we knew nobody, the only thing we 
knew was that the MSC had done a pre-assessment for an ecolabel base on 
request from the GAMFIDA … So, we went around, talking to communities 
and talking to them about fisheries and where we thought we were able to help. 
So, we did that for about two weeks. So, we had a big meeting with everybody, 
the women, the harvesters. In the project, you can count on the number of 
people who hold the project’. (interview no. 5) 
The presence of external actors is being recognized right down to community levels as they 
are more engaged in this process than the government in some situations. Local authorities 
within fishing communities regularly interact and collaborate with external actors on 
projects that seek to benefit them directly. 
4.4 Challenges to actors participation for FIPs in Africa 
FIPs in Africa are challenged with several pertinent issues that limit their improvement or 
their proper management. This research supports the assertion of many scholars who point 
fingers at the complexity of fisheries management or highlight difficulties faced by 
fisheries to meet the various improvement and certification standards owing to their small-
scale and developing country nature (Wakamatsu & Wakamatsu, 2017). For example, some 
people argue that standards need to be developed for specific contexts, while others argue 
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for standards to be applicable anywhere. An interview participant from an international 
NGO argues that. considering just the nature of small-scale fisheries and its drawbacks 
compared to those industrial or large-scale fishery is more of a facet. The participant 
explained: 
 ‘But what I am saying is that regardless of whether it is in Africa or Canada or 
the UK, sustainability is sustainability. A fishery is healthy when the level of 
the catch can be sustained over time … The MSC standard again is rooted in 
the FAO code of conduct. So [it] is not inconsistent but is consistent with what 
people across the world who are also members of the FAO have agreed on what 
is the standard for sustainability’ (interview no. 11) 
Though the standard remains the same despite the sophistication of the fishery, many of 
the interviews from research and industry still argued that the standards of FIP 
improvement indicators are very high for an African small-scale fishery. For example, one 
participant made the assertion: 
‘But since then we have done several assessments, they never seem to get over 
the bar despite the progress. So, for small-scale fisheries in developing 
countries the bar is really too high, and you don’t get any partial credit for 
improvement although the FIP kind of give you an OK, you are in a FIP and 
you are working towards certification and some companies can buy you fish if 
you are in the FIP and not certified, like the Walmart or something’. (interview 
no. 3) 
Another participant similarly explained the high standard level for such fisheries: 
‘I mean especially in our situation, the standards are really hard, and you know 
more and more MSC starts realizing that their model isn’t adapted to small-
scale fisheries and they are good for large-scale fisheries that have a lot of 
money’. (interview no. 16) 
 
Regardless of the inextricable link between the cost of running a FIP and meeting the 
required sustainability standards, African FIPs have several drawbacks that make it very 
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challenging for them to achieve or carry out adequate levels of improvements with or 
without external support considering their financial challenges and limitations in the region. 
Underpinning the enhancement of sustainable fishery practices by all participating actors 
in Africa is always challenging due to the numerous factors affecting the area. A low level 
of peer education, the available? modes of communication and the cultural practices of the 
people are three examples of limiting factors with externally-led FIP projects (CapFish, 
2012). For instance, it takes considerable time for local people to develop the trust of the 
actors needed to provide relevant information to FIP leaders that will help them with their 
activities and plans. Usually, these fishers always have a lot of information to share officials 
and leaders as a participant said: 
‘I don’t say it was minimal, they were engaged when information was needed. 
But generally, direct community engagement was limited. It was mostly done 
with the government, district officer and the provision of such information’. 
(Interview no. 14) 
This suggests that while participation and collaboration are relatively robust procedurally, 
the actual engagement and capacity is quite variable and faces numerous challenges and 
barriers. Firstly, key participants in these African fisheries (that is the small-scale fishers) 
usually have little or no formal education and depend on their traditional knowledge to fish 
and carry out other related activities, especially in their local languages as a fishery 
consultant in the region posited during our interview session. With this level of illiteracy 
amongst fishers in the region, the promotion of better management, policy options, and new 
technologies is very challenging as an NGO participant explained: ‘We are dealing with 
communities with high illiteracy rates’ (interview no. 16). This challenge obviously affects 
the full participation of these people during the development of the FIP policies or its work 
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plan. Operating within such a context with low literacy levels, and language barriers that 
are quite complex make finding and motivating actors such as fishers difficult. A fishery 
consultant explained:  
‘Generally, the understanding of the MSC and the general works of FIPs is very 
poor in the communities because is a technical thing. And the communities are 
generally the language and peer education are also a problem’. (interview no. 
14) 
Secondly, there are issues of very limited human and financial resources for the smooth 
operationalization of FIP activities and this affects the willingness of the government and 
fishers to participate in the process. Most of the funding from external sources are usually 
used in building the capacity of local staff to assist in the process. As a participant 
explained:  
‘…generally, capacity will be the big thing—having human resource and 
financial capacity to deliver these improvements and for it to be long-lasting. 
The other thing is to have fishermen and government at both ends to make it 
happen’. (interview no. 10) 
Although the capacity building is always prioritized within FIP activities, there is always 
the problem of trained personnel leaving and failing to commit to their role and this causes 
a very big gap or problems with the smooth functioning of the FIP. Their absence or 
departure could impede the process especially if the absent person had a key role. As a 
consultant explained: ‘The person I was with has now left unfortunately and the project is 
in the middle of nowhere’ (interview no. 14). Of course, there is also a need for continued 
or ongoing capacity building among those who do not leave as another participant 
103 
 
explained: ‘… there is a need for key capacity building so that people are willing to commit 
in to’ (interview no. 11). 
So, capacity development remains a very key challenge. As another participant explained: 
‘The next biggest is capacity [since] they don’t always have the capacity to 
implement the project. You need to take the skills and expertise, you need to 
take people from institutions, from government structures to try and get them 
involved in the implementation of the project’ (Interview no. 14). 
Furthermore, another issue is the financial commitment from the stakeholders themselves 
to support these activities. A participant raised the issue of how FIPs in the region are 
generally overdependent on external funding: 
‘The biggest one, of course, is funding, they always need more money to fund 
the project … Like on the funding issue, I don’t mean this in any disparity way, 
African countries generally wait for money to come in and then they take the 
money and they spend it and try and do a project and they wait for the next lot 
of money to come in and do more’ (interview no. 14) 
The problem of governments, industries or even fishers not committed to supporting 
financially these FIP related activities is an additional major drawback. This ubiquitous 
situation on the continent makes progress within FIP initiatives stall or become very 
stagnant. In terms of industries, despite their typical engagement in FIP activities, they are 
seldom active from a financial perspective in most cases as an interviewee explained: 
‘None of those projects in the region did we get any support. No financial 
support from the industry. We do some support in the sense of verbal support 
and access to the fishery and that sort of thing. And the fishing industry was 
engaged in these projects, there was generally a reluctance to engage in the 
program’ (Interview no. 14) 
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A participant explained that this lack of industry and government financial support happens 
to be a major drawback to the management and commitment of this group of actors in FIP 
processes: ‘None, I think one of the biggest problems […] think the government is another 
big one. The lack of government support’ (interview no. 16). As interview no. 14 explained, 
the lack of financial support in a co-financing manner for these FIPs makes commitment 
very lacking and forces in most cases the external partner being the one doing all the 
activities while the government is simply observing the process.  
Additionally, access to good and quality fishery data, including good surveillance systems 
for these fisheries, remains a very big issue especially for scientists working in the area. 
African fisheries have very poor data management systems and in most cases lack experts 
to handle such issues as one participant reiterated: 
‘The most difficult [issue] about Africa is that there [are] a lot of fishermen and 
there is no good control and enforcement and there is no real data about landing, 
and many, many species and is very difficult to manage the fisheries and to 
assess stocks there because you don’t have information about the species and 
this kind of things and is the most difficult thing to get good data from the stock 
will help to manage’ (Interview no.15). 
Furthermore, the lack of proper surveillance systems due to inadequate technologies and 
expertise makes the fisheries very exposed to IUU fishing especially by foreign boats with 
signed MOU’s with the governments. An interviewee made such assertions: ‘… they just 
don’t have to worry about having to answer to the local authorities because the local 
authorities don’t have the means for surveillance or patrol boats or staffs’ (Interview no. 
12). 
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Surveillance technically is an issue in ensuring agreed improvement decisions and that 
plans, and activities are respected for the attainment of their objective. Addressing these 
lack of stock assessments and good data gathering systems problems remains an issue for 
many FIPs in Africa. A participant explained that a major challenge consists of: 
‘… the capacity for governance and management. Just to ensure compliance, 
but to have compliance you also need to have data and one of the things missing 
from a lot of fishery management having a good quality stock assessment, 
management plans, and policies, management procedures … A lot of cases, the 
African fisheries suffers through access control and governance and also 
information of the fishery’. (interview no. 10) 
As noted by a participant, the governance system of most African institutions and 
governments are also major challenges. There is no certainty on how long government 
officials can be in their position. A project could be initiated by an official but later on, that 
official could be removed or changed from the position. Another person who has little or 
no idea or interest in the project may take her/his place. As a participant noted: ‘the other 
one is politics because politics is a problem, you find people being taken away from their 
position because of whatever reason, particularly in Mozambique it was a problem’ 
(interview no. 14). The uncertain nature of a key actor’s sustained involvement causes a lot 
of trouble for and is a barrier to successful FIP activities. Also, the passion with which 
certain appointed individuals participate in these initiatives varies from person to person. 
Whether they are replaced due to political reasons such as a cabinet shuffle, or other 
reasons, FIP progress may have delayed as a result.  
Finally, the level of sensitization amongst the people on these activities is always very 
limiting. Many of the fishers engaged with these fisheries do not exactly know how they 
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will benefit or what are the long-term advantages of participating in such a process. A 
participant explained: 
‘The first one is to organize fishers and fishing space. There are lots of conflicts 
with moving and set gear. The second one is to have good sensitization on how 
to stop it and enforce the law. And then some bad practices like nets doing 
bycatch, so the main issue is the juvenile fishing and organize fishing space’. 
(Interview no. 1) 
In sum, although FIPs in Africa is challenged by significant issues, they also shop 
considerable promise as a vehicle for change. Multiple actors and stakeholders are engaged 
in FIP processes and initiatives in varied locations. Governments typically participate 
through departmental and political support. There also exists the involvement of multiple 
local and international actors (for example seafood industries, NGOs, international support 
from government and fishers’ associations as in most cases). There is typically a significant 
degree of collaboration and interaction between and among all stakeholders involved. 
Different actors participate for different reasons. A fisher’s motivation to participate in 
these FIPs is greatly influenced by NGOs through community support programs and their 
involvement in local fishery governance processes. Market or other economic incentives, 
at least for the moment, may not be their principal focus for getting involved at least in the 
beginning. Some are interested in creating improvements that will, in the long run, create 
more market opportunities for them. Overall, community and fisher involvement, interest 
and motivation for becoming active in FIP projects is mixed. Some groups or actors have 
more capacity to participate than others. The capacity of some local groups and even 
government agencies to support FIPs can be extremely limited. Typically, while some of 
the participating actors are focused on short-term efforts that can ensure sustainability and 
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or conservation of their fisheries, others are more focused on the longer-term goal of 
achieving MSC certification where there are possibilities and market potentials. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE GAMBIA SOLE FISHERY -A 
COMPREHENSIVE FIP CASE STUDY 
5.1: Background of the Sole Fishery 
Sole fish is the most important and highly commercialized fish in the Gambia, with its 2006 
harvest accounting for 1, 559 MT out of the 40, 000 MT total fish landings in the country 
(Fatajo, Tobey & Drammeh, 2010). As per the Gambian Department of Fisheries (Gambia 
DOF, 2006), the sole fishery business sector alone accounts for more than 5000 jobs in the 
country and other livelihoods indirectly depending on the fishery.  
The country’s fisheries legislation, through the Fishery Act of 2007, provides a legal 
framework for fisheries management and makes provisions for the inclusion of a co-
management structure for better management of the fishery. Within the African continent, 
the Gambian fishery co-management system makes provisions for the management of 
fishery resources in the country by separate authorities aside from those of the Department 
of Fishery (DoF). This policy creates space within the governance of the resources for the 
participation of actors such as local fishers, fishers’ groups/associations, government, 
experts and officials coordinating activities of the co-managed system. The Fishery Act 
states: 
‘Section 14 of the Act gives power to the Minister of Fisheries to declare 
Special Management Areas for the purpose of community-based fisheries 
conservation and management, while section 15 of the Act also gives power to 
the Minister to establish Community Fisheries Centers (CFCs) for the purpose 
of community-based fisheries conservation and management of Special 
Management Areas or part of it’ (Coastal Resources Center of the University 
of Rhode Island, 2014, p.1).  
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This Fishery’s Act, however, was weak and never implemented according to scoping by 
researchers from the Coastal Resources Center (CRC) through the USAID Ba Nafaa project 
(CRC-URI, 2014). In line with such evaluations and needs to better strengthen the Act, in 
2009, the Gambia Department of Fisheries (DoFish) requested CRC through the Ba, Nafaa 
project, to integrate components to improve the sole fishery. Through stakeholders’ 
consultations led by CRC, a revised legislation for the proposed co-management system of 
fisheries in the country was developed and enshrined in the constitution. This latter move 
made provisions for the involvement of all relevant parties and resulted in the development 
of a work plan for the sole fishery (CRC-URI, 2014). Though not considered a FIP as of 
that time, the process laid the foundation for the eventual development of a FIP in the 
Gambia. 
Prior to this improvement effort for the management of this fishery, GAMFIDA (Gambia 
Artisanal Fisheries Development Agency7), in 2007, invited experts from a third-party 
certification body accredited to the MSC to do a pre-assessment of the sole fisheries to see 
if they could go into full assessment and obtain the MSC certification. However, they failed 
to pass the MSC pre-assessment phase. All the relevant background information and the 
recommendations from the failed MSC pre-assessment nevertheless provided the basis on 
which the Ba Nafaa-led project developed its fisheries improvement action plan including 
community consultations. To date, actors such as The Department of Fisheries, Ba Nafaa, 
Atlantic Seafood, GAMFIDA, the University of Rhode Island, and WWF-West Africa 
                                                          
7 Created in 1997, GAMFIDA is a representation of small-scale fishers in the Gambia, who mobilise 
themselves and share relevant information and training to improve their fishing activities and outputs. The 
association has a credit and saving facilities for fishers within Banjul and other related villages. 
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Marine Program Office (WWF-WAMPO) continue to collaborate to improve the fisheries 
towards sustainability and possibly MSC certification (CRC-URI, 2014). The presence and 
participation of these actors have been driven by the motivation of the people themselves 
through GAMFIDA who initiated procedures for the first pre-assessment in 2007. The 
motivation and enthusiasm for improvements and advancement of the FIP by the locals 
have been a key aspect that attracted many international actors and researchers with various 
funding support (CRC-URI, 2014). This, amongst most other FIPs in Africa, makes the 
Gambian case a very interesting one for the region as the people’s efforts were key in 
attracting other actors and because it has a local co-managed structure (NASCOM), unlike 
others FIPs in the African context which are more directly led and coordinated by external 
NGOs.  
5.1.1 The Gambian Sole Fishery FIP 
According to the updated fisheryprogress.org tracking website for fisheries participating in 
FIPs, the Gambian Sole fishery and the Moroccan Sardine fishery were, as of writing, the 
only two fisheries in the African region undergoing comprehensive FIPs. The Gambian 
sole fishery is a unique and very interesting FIP case considering the type of participants, 
governance structure and the various improvements the fishery has undergone since 2008, 
after its first MSC pre-assessment in 2007. Unlike most other FIP management structures, 
the Sole fishery has a separate and independent co-management body with the lead 
organization being the National Sole Fishery Co-Management Committee (NASCOM), 
amongst other stakeholders such as government departments, industry (Atlantic Seafood 
Company Ltd) and its basket of supporting partners and international research institutions. 
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They are all engaged in ensuring the fishery meets sustainability standards to possibly re-
apply for MSC certification, with this goal driven in part by the demand for sole in the 
international (mainly EU) market (multiple interviews).  
 
However, actor motivations are multiple and varied. The Gambians are interested in 
making their fishery more sustainable and strive to garner the benefits of being certified; 
the local industry is interested in having the eco-label to promote and sell more product in 
the international market; and most other international actors are interested in improving the 
fishery towards sustainability while addressing food security issues in the Gambia.  
 
 
Figure 4: The map of the Gambia showing its various fishing areas. Retrieved from 
Gambia -Senegal Sustainable Fishery Project USAID/BaNafaa, Year 4 Annual Report 
(Fiscal Year 2013)  
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Through Ba Nafaa, improvements in the fishery took a new turn in 2008 after they failed 
to pass the MSC pre-assessment, which was supported at the time by the Gambian 
government and GAMFIDA. Later, between 2009 to 2010 and with similar support from 
the University of Rhode Island, the fishery went into a full FIP process and a work plan 
was developed for execution by all participating parties. As FIP guidelines are generally 
set to meet standards set by the MSC, the fishery went through another MSC-pre-
assessment in 2015 yet failed again (fisheryprogress.org. 2018). Despite such frustration, 
NASCOM, and its promoters used the findings and recommendations of the 2015 pre-
assessment, along with various other supports, to launch a comprehensive FIP using CASS 
guidelines. This FIP is set to run up to 2022 with specific internal evaluation timeframes to 
achieve their ultimate objectives (sustainability and certification). An interesting 
component of this FIP is the power given to the co-management body (NASCOM) which 
involves various stakeholders and where the government representative is not considered 
the leader. Based on the literature review above, it is quite unusual for the government to 
make provisions in its fishery policies for a separate management institution as has been 
noted by an interviewee. Despite government’s capacity weaknesses, the various actors 
participating in the FIP are optimistic and steadfast in achieving the MSC blue eco-label 
for the Gambian Sole. 
5.2 Findings/Analysis 
5.2.1 Motivation and Stakeholders Involvement 
The unique and pro-active co-management structure of fishery governance in the Gambia 
has gone a long way to promote multi-stakeholder involvement. It has resulted in various 
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joint efforts that seek to enhance the sustainability of the Sole fishery. Before the creation 
of NASCOM, local fishery associations such as GAMFIDA had been present in the country 
and seeking to ensure the sole fishery’s sustainability and possibly increase its 
competitiveness in the international market. They are now seeking the MSC eco-label by 
mobilizing member resources and with support from the government. Though efforts 
towards achieving this MSC label have been quite challenging for the fishery, there is 
evidence of a participatory approach in the management and activities within this fishery 
whereby both state and private actors participate. They each represent and have their own 
unique motivations, roles, and expectations to be realized from their participation in the 
FIP, but according to one participant in this study, share a common set of goals: for the 
‘sole fishery [to] access the international market, sustainable conservation, and 
management, including social, economic, biological, and ecological components’ 
(Interview no.9). 
The Gambian Sole FIP has as principal actors NASCOM, DoFish, the Atlantic Seafood 
Company Ltd and several donor organizations, NGOs and international seafood industries 
(fisheryprogress.org).  One of the interviewees outlined additional stakeholders involved 
in the FIP activities including: ‘… fishermen, women fish workers (smokers, dryers, and 
traders), the association of Gambia fishing companies, department of fisheries, the Ministry 
of Fisheries, Department of Parks and Wildlife Management, National Environment 
Agency (NEA), Department of Forestry and local government authorities’ (Interview no. 
8). As previously mentioned, improvements had earlier begun for the sole fishery through 
local institutional support from the people themselves, which later attracted international 
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organizations to support their activities. As a participant from one of the donor 
organizations posited: 
‘So, we went and talked to people in the fishery and they told us they were 
interested in the sole fishery which had had a pre-assessment done and they 
didn’t pass, and they were still interested in doing it … So, there were 12 points 
in it and we said “okay let’s start working on those points and see if we can 
address the weaknesses and concerns and get it up to a score where eventually 
they can do an assessment and hopefully get the MSC certification”’ (Interview 
no. 3). 
Congruently, referring to the motivation of the people themselves to ensure improvements 
in their fishery, a similar participant from a donor organization made the assertion: 
‘So, when the URI USAID-led project came in in 2009, we found these 
initiatives staling, so the project was able to support this initiative that was 
already installed, so the project was able to [build[ enough support for this 
initiative that was already initiated by the government and other actors … So, 
we weren’t on the ground working with them at that time. That means that 
basically, there is totally the stakeholders, the fishermen and we think it is the 
fishermen themselves wanting to do these and make the impact’ (Interview no. 
4). 
This statement shows how interested the people were in the process as well as the origins 
of their involvement. In this case, the Gambians showed significant interest in improving 
their fishery before the MSC process began, which appears to be somewhat unusual or 
uncommon for an African fishery based on the review of the literature above.  
To date, the Gambia has one sole seafood buyer (Atlantic Seafood Limited through 
Network Seafood8) that processes and exports the fish to Europe and other international 
                                                          
8 The Atlantic Seafood Limited has been the only private company in the Gambia processing and exporting 
sole fish. Their role in the MSC-pre-assessment was at the level of providing useful data for the fishery that 
assisted in various stock and other assessments. 
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markets through their main company branch in the Netherlands. This fishery has an average 
annual harvest of roughly 1,559 Metric Tonnes (Gambia DOF, 2006) but there are 
sustainability concerns. As an industry participant explained: ‘But then your interest is the 
sustainability, fish is fast declining, before I was doing 10 tons but now if I have 4 tons I 
am happy’ (Interview no.2). This statement typically supports the usual arguments for the 
need to promote improvements for the sustainability of fisheries. 
But industry motivation and interest in the FIP is not only to make sure the fishery is 
sustainable in the long run, but also to garner the benefit every fishery seeks to get when 
they become eco-certified in the international market. A participant explained: 
‘we got to the project because we wanted to get the eco-labeled product and that 
is why we joined the project. Atlantic Seafood need ecolabel product, we have 
90% of the Sole is processed by AS, so the project had to pass through AS to 
know the production. So, our main aim is to get the ecolabel to sell our fish and 
to participate in good management fishing (sustainable fishing) so [that] is our 
main reason’ (Interview no. 2). 
Unlike most other FIPs in Africa, which are predominantly NGO led, the Gambian sole 
case appears more locally integrated with the NASCOM leading most of the activities.  
Stakeholders, through the agreed MOU, know what specifically their tasks are in the 
process. There has been notable stakeholder involvement in the process although with 
different levels of engagement amongst them as one participant explained: 
‘… Well, we work with DoFish, and the fishermen associations and the fishery 
processing industry – Atlantic Seafood … And so, through the approach URI 
uses very often, participatory stakeholder-driven process, doing research and 
engaging all stakeholders from the fishermen at landing sites up to the national 
level. So, through those approaches and processes, we were able over 5 years 
to facilitate the process’ (Interview no. 4). 
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The Gambia FIP was driven by a complex mix of international and local actors and 
interests. Despite the presence of external partners and the key role of external market 
forces, provisions were made in the Gambia FIP work plan for participating local actors to 
have specific and meaningful roles in the process. Although most of the improvement 
initiatives were initiated by the researchers from URI, local actors still had their roles, as 
pointed out by a study participant: ‘The project was coordinated by URI from the US and 
it was them who initiated the project then NASCOM and DoFish’ (Interview no. 2). It is 
worth noting that this USAID-led project had WWF as the coordinating partner and an ex-
officio representative from WWF made clear his/her interest in the process by stating: 
‘When I do conservation there I do some biological aspect and socioeconomic 
aspects and other issues like national park management there. And the main 
issue was to help women to stop all the juvenile fishing activities’ (Interview 
no. 1). 
Aside from these international partners supporting the FIP, specific activities undertaken 
by the FIP are coordinated with each person being assigned specific roles and functions, 
ranging from providing fish stock data (Atlantic Seafood) to coordinating activities at 
landing sites. As one participant explained:  
‘So, you have the government, the ministry and the department of fisheries, and 
at the landing sites, they have government agents that are from the department 
of fisheries. And then we had on the ground…the various associations of 
fishermen. So, we had NAFO, GAMFIDA’ (Interview no. 4). 
This kind of participatory approach generally helped decision-making at the FIP table and 
facilitated a sense of belonging and self-pride within the whole process as noted by one 
interviewee: ‘And that’s where stakeholders really go to fill the ownership over the decision 
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making and what was happening because they were part of the knowledge and information 
that was going into it’ (Interview no. 4). 
 
Though USAID assisted immensely in the initial conceptualization of these FIP activities 
based on the guideline and activities that were already completed with GAMFIDA having 
undertaken an MSC pre-assessment of the fishery, their principal motivation for selecting 
the Gambia, as a participant explained, was: 
 
‘The USAID standpoint, they were interested in biodiversity protection, food 
security, and economic growth. And sustainably managing the fishery is 
important for biodiversity conservation and also for the general economic 
development of the country… (Interview no. 3). 
But with such motivation from this external partner and with adequate financial strength, 
there was some degree of openness and transparency in their involvement, which speaks to 
their overall objectives to help the people and make their fishery sustainable.  
With regards to the URI team, through the Ba Nafaa project, the team decided to work on 
strengthening the scientific and technological competences and knowledge-base of the 
people. As a participant mentioned: ‘For URI project it was to show them better fishing 
activities and how to do sustainable fishing, so they work on that, on best fishing time, 
resting and non-resting periods…’ (Interview no. 1). In terms of interactions between the 
government and the locals, the same participant explained the nature of communication and 
decision-making: 
‘…we inform government, we make agreements on how the project will work. 
And in our activities, the field person will help us implement. For the 
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association, we just talk together and do a PRA and know their interest and 
major expectation and work with them’ (Interview no. 1). 
Similarly, another participant explained how it was possible to effectively delegate tasks 
amongst the members and then explained the approach they used: ‘Okay through a 
stakeholder workshop, we facilitated the process to develop a management plan and a lot 
of the research was also action research, so a lot of the processing company and the guys 
will use fishermen to collect data’ (Interview no. 3). 
Although coordination and delegation of specific roles were done largely by URI, a 
participant alluded to the need for fishers and industry representatives to get more involved 
in the process. The participant said: 
‘I believe [if] the fishermen and the fishing industry over there do not participate 
financially it won’t be reasonable. So there is a need for them, too, to invest in 
it and show their interest and not only from the government, not [just] URI. So, 
it will be good if the certification interest comes from fishermen and industry’ 
(Interview no. 1). 
This externally supported initiative reinvigorated the overall FIP process, but the 
motivation and willingness from the people have been a key strength underpinning the 
success of these fishery’s improvements so far. The people did not just wait for external 
partners to come in and decide on what they should do. This specific aspect was emphasized 
by a participant who said: 
‘Again the Gambia and as I open up and started talking with you. At least people 
came to us and ask us for help and told us “this is what we wanna do. Can you 
help us?” So they kind of already know what to do, unlike other places where 
institutions like the World Bank comes in and ask them to do what they didn’t 
want to do it (Interview no. 3). 
 
Foley (2013) raises the question of the kind of interactions that do exist between local or 
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national authorities and with other private authorities. The Gambian Sole FIP shows 
evidence of a mutual and all-inclusive governance process with participating actors having 
their fair share of control over and say in the process, while also ensuring national 
authorities are given their rightful place. 
Generally, the market demand for the sole fishery, especially in Europe and other 
international markets, is a critically important driver for the improvement of the sole fishery 
in the Gambia. Major international seafood giants such as Kaufland are supporting the FIP 
process and are helping the fishery work towards obtaining the eco-label because it is good 
for business. Supporting the Gambian sole to have the MSC eco-label is a very important 
business decision because it will help to improve Kaufland’s market share and increase 
demand for its products. An industry participant explained: 
‘Yes, because Kaufland Seafood Company, South Africa Fish exporters and 
IDEKA International have shown interest in the Gambian sole should an 
ecolabel be obtained in the future. So Kaufland was able to raise one hundred 
thousand Euro to support the implementation of the Sole management plan’. 
(Interview no. 9) 
Overall, the presence and interest of these international seafood firms, NGOs, government, 
researchers, donor organizations and the locals have made the Gambian Sole FIP a unique 
and interesting FIP case from the African region. The case represents the emergence of 
transnational environmental governance influenced by a political economy of interactions 
and collaborative relationships, and where different actors bring different resources to, and 
exercise different degrees of power at, the collaborative FIP table. 
 
Table 5 shows a summary of participating actors and their roles in the Gambian Sole FIP.  
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Table 5: List of participating actors and their roles in the Gambian FIP 
Name of 
Actor 
Type of Actor Role(s) in the FIP Actors Motivation 
NASCOM Sole fishery Co-
management 
structure 
• FIP leads and 
coordinates 
• Lobbying for 
support 
• Implementation 
and follow up of 
the work plan 
and 
improvement 
plans  
• To see 
improvements 
to the fishery, 
its 
sustainability 
and meeting 
standards to 
certification 
set by the 
MSC 
Department of 
Fisheries 
(DoF) 
Government  • Provide 
administrative 
support 
• Participate in 
work plan 
development 
• General 
improvement 
of the fishery 
to better serve 
the people of 
the Gambia 
and their 
livelihood 
GAMFIDA Fishery 
Department 
• Initiated the first 
MSC pre-
assessment 
• Initiated 
improvement 
activities 
• Seeking 
improvements 
and possibly 
MSC 
certification 
Atlantic Industry/processor • Assist in • To see the 
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Seafood 
Company 
Limited 
providing useful 
data for the 
fishery  
Sole fishery 
attain the 
ecolabel and 
garner more 
market access 
internationally 
USAID Ba 
Nafaa Project 
International 
Agency 
• Provides 
financial support 
• Help develop a 
FIP work plan 
with other 
stakeholders 
• Carrying our 
scientific 
research on the 
fishery 
• Organise 
meetings with 
other 
stakeholders 
• Assisted in the 
second MSC 
pre-assessment 
• Help address 
food security 
and better 
livelihood 
issues 
• See the fishery 
get improved 
towards 
sustainability 
and better 
stock 
conservation 
• Help the 
fishery get the 
MSC ecolabel 
MSC International NGO • Assist in 
lobbying for 
support for the 
fisheries 
activities 
• Help the 
Gambian Sole 
to finally get 
eco-certified  
Kaufland Seafood Industry • Financial • Support 
122 
 
Company support for 
improvements 
and pre-
assessment 
improvement 
initiatives and 
pre-
assessments 
Rockefeller 
Foundation 
Grant/Donor 
Agency 
• Financial 
assistance for 
activities 
• Support 
improvement 
initiatives 
WWF/IUCN International NGO • Technical and 
scientific 
support and 
training 
•  Support 
training and 
improvement  
 
 
5.2.2 Financing  
 
The Gambian sole fishery FIP has benefited over the years from numerous funding sources, 
including funding from the government, local fishing associations, NGOs, international 
development organizations, international fishing industries and donor countries. Although 
they all have varying objectives and motivations as section 5.2.1 outlines, their ultimate 
and collective goal is to improve fishery sustainability while improving international 
market access and the livelihood of the people. Local stakeholders have been very 
committed to these fishery improvement efforts by funding the first ever pre-assessment in 
2007 by GAMFIDA, with support from the government and the MSC. An interviewee 
noted: 
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‘oh you mean the MSC pre-assessment that cost like $30,000? So, for the first 
one that was done before URI came in 2008 and that was GAMFIDA that 
initiated that with the MSC, and that was funded by the MSC to fund that pre-
assessment’. (Interview no. 4). 
It is worth noting that the MSC usually does not normally fund or carry out pre-
assessments, but the Gambian sole case was viewed as a type pilot project for the region 
and as such received support from the MSC. With a strong push from local people for the 
project, the effort then attracted and received support from other major donor organizations. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the MSC pre-assessment in 2007, there remained a need for 
fishery improvements in the Gambia. Through sustained donor interest, the US regional 
mission for the Gambia identified the sole fishery as the beneficiary of a USAID project 
for West Africa. As a participant explained: 
‘So, we had an umbrella award from USAID and Sustainable Coastal 
Communities and Ecosystem and the US regional mission in the country, so 
they were interested in working in West Africa and you know we have been 
working in Senegal, Gambia, and Ghana’ (Interview no. 3). 
This USAID-led project was coordinated through the WWF regional office for the Gambia 
and Senegal. This was supplemented with other funding coordinated by WWF that 
targeting specific fishing activities as outlined by an official from WWF: 
‘we had funds from USAID, and URI for this NASCOM and Sole fishery. For 
the women, we had a basket of funding like a foundation in Switzerland, 
MAVA, which belong to a drug company and they are the main sponsor of 
WWF and IUCN for a long time and they constitute a Dutch and Spanish fund, 
and the project was to help the women’ (Interview no. 1). 
The Atlantic Seafood company provided human resources in terms of providing staff to 
assist in data collection or attending to researchers when they visited the factory and 
124 
 
requested information within the reach of the company. Their role was vital in supporting 
the directions in which improvements could realistically be done, largely through the 
provision of data. An official from the industry made this assertion: ‘Nope we don’t put 
cash. We just provided human resources and information or to talk to fishers and we give 
their contact, so we give mostly human support and data they need for their activity’ 
(Interview no. 2). Another industry participant agreed with this and said: ‘No there was no 
money, it was from MSC themselves. And we gave just data and nothing else’. (Interview 
no. 6) 
Government for its part, though very supportive, was challenged like most other 
governments in Africa in terms of the amount of support they could provide for such 
initiatives, and as such relied on donor support as noted by a participant: ‘And there is no 
way the small-scale or even the Gambian government could do all of that if not of donor 
assistance to achieve all that’ (Interview no. 3). But NASCOM, a co-management structure 
created to lead activities for the fishery through assistance from the USAID-led project, 
was very proactive in sourcing funding to support activities as evidenced by the example 
below provided by an interview participant: ‘Funding support was solicited by NASCOM 
through the University of Rhode Island’s Coastal Resources Center (URI/CRC) to 
implement the management plan and deficiencies identified in 2015’ (Interview no. 9). In 
2015, they received support from a major seafood company (Kaufland), amongst other 
supports, to fund the second MSC pre-assessment as a participant explained: 
‘… and the last one by Kaufland seafood in Germany. They gave $50,000 and 
a patrol boat to do the pre-assessment. So, the Kaufland grants, USAID grant 
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and other money we fundraised through Rockefeller and MSC recently’ 
(Interview no. 3). 
So, neither NASCOM, the government nor the industry provided direct funding to support 
the second pre-assessment, but through better lobbying and interest from external partners, 
NASCOM was able to solicit and receive other grants. As a participant said: ‘We have had 
more small support to them through kind of a FIP grant and Rockefeller foundation grant 
for small-scale levels’ (Interview no. 3). NASCOM thus have been able to carry out and 
accomplish major tasks and challenges through accumulating multiple sources of funding. 
In the case of the Gambia, although government participation was not as insignificant as it 
has been in most other African FIPs, it nevertheless faced challenges as noted below: ‘Is 
not like they are not behind in terms of what they want to go in term if their policy, they 
are just limited in both their human and financial resources given to them by their 
government to manage’ (Interview no.3). Despite the lack of direct funding from 
government sources, the government worked closely with NASCOM to bring in funding 
that could support FIP activities as another participant explained: 
‘the new government now from the old one are very, very engaged now, their 
commitment to this kind of activity and this kind of resource management 
governance team I think is very strong. They are in the process of negotiating a 
World Bank regional fishery project funding and that’s gonna go directly to 
government entities from the World Bank, so they were already committing 
some of these resources to support the FIP as far as I know…’ (Interview no. 
4). 
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5.2.3 Governance Structure and Policy Processes 
Given the deep interactions among different types of actors and organizations, the Gambian 
sole fishery FIP initiative can be considered a case of transnational hybrid governance as 
defined by scholars working in this field (see for example Foley, 2017; Ponte, 2012; 
Bonanno & Constance, 2008). The Gambian FIP involved the participation of a broad range 
of actors from private non-state actors, the public, and NGOs interacting together within a 
policy development process. This FIP effort also saw many challenges related to power 
differences, competing interests, and ultimately, who had most control or influence over 
decision-making. Though various scholars such as Vogel (2010), Gulbrandsen (2009) and 
Auld et al. (2009) emphasize the shift in management systems from public to private 
management realms, especially for certification related initiatives, the Gambian FIP 
suggests there is an ongoing role for the state in emerging hybrid public-private, state-non-
state interactions that cross international borders. 
The Gambia Fishery Act in 2007 made provisions for a co-management structure in which 
power was delegated to the NASCOM with a specific mandate that would see it collaborate 
with government departments. A participant explained: 
‘There was a visionary language in the Gambian fishery law revision of 2007 
which said that the government (DoFish) had the authority to grant use right 
for special management areas. So, you know that was something very unique 
in Africa that the law had some enabling language for co-management and use 
rights in fisheries. So that was there as of 2007’ (Interview no. 4). 
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In this instance, power was delegated to NASCOM which had the right to make decisions 
or to co-develop policies regarding management For instance, NASCOM had the right to 
close the fishery as noted by an interview participant: 
‘To me  a big deal there also was how Gambia had a very interesting legislation 
that allowed for use rights to be granted and there were very few places in Africa 
where the fisheries legislation basically allows for the granting of use rights. 
So, the use rights to the sole artisanal fisheries up to 9 nautical miles to sea was 
given to NASCOM and is a group use right. So, they have the right to harvest 
and manage that fishery granted and sign off by the minister within the 
management plan’ (Interview no. 3). 
Although NASCOM had authority to make decisions, like any other local institutions in 
Africa, it was also challenged with financial and human capacity, capability and internal 
human dynamic issues. For instance, a participant raised concerns about NASCOM 
membership composition and how members interacted with external partners. This 
participant noted: ‘they spoke only with some leaders, not all, but they need to go deep, 
also NASCOM, 80% of them are not fishers. So as of now, they don’t really involve fishers’ 
(Interview no. 1). Such challenges prompted external funders to develop and deliver 
capacity building workshops and training sessions to ensure that the FIP had a strategic 
management plan guiding their efforts as noted below: 
‘Okay through a stakeholder workshop, we facilitated the process to develop a 
management plan and a lot of the research was also action research … Then we 
proceeded to develop … and organize the NASCOM, and that was a multi-
stakeholder committee, that constituted the industry, the fishermen from the 12 
landing sites, DoFISH, and a few other people and I think that the composition 
can be seen in the management plan that is also online’ (Interview no. 3). 
As the statement above illustrates, the composition of NASCOM included relevant 
stakeholders but not only fishers. The decision-making processes was interactive and 
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participatory as NASCOM depended on the existing LASCOM (Local Association of Sole 
Co-Management) for information before any preliminary decisions could be taken or made. 
As another participant outlined: ‘So NASCOM gathered info from LASCOM, so the 
NASCOM had LACOM members, so they say we want to close for 6 months since they 
gather that from their local knowledge and we want to make that closure for 1 nautical mile’ 
(Interview no. 5). This quote illustrates how the people at the local levels through 
LASCOM had the power to make important decisions such as closure periods. 
As some scholars have posited (Foley, 2017; Hatanaka & Busch, 2008), management and 
control of such processes are always being influenced within a hybridized network system 
involving interactions between private actors and existing government institutions. This is 
congruent with the statement made by one of the NGOs officials who explained the way 
decisions are made: 
‘For this main basket program, WWF decided all. From my own funding, I 
make my program and every end of the year, I write my report and then I am 
audited.  So I make all decision. But for NASCOM, URI was really involved in 
the decision making, 60-70% of the decision will come from URI who made 
most of the research and other decisions’ (Interview no. 1). 
 
A number of participants made comments about the effectiveness of stakeholder 
involvement in the FIP process. For instance, one participant raised the issue of proper 
stakeholder involvement in the overall process. Participating actors were given a place in 
any of the FIP development activities and decision-making process as the participant 
outlines:  
‘So, the stakeholder groups were the ones that will set the management 
objectives and decide all the options you can do for management and which 
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ones they will implement and then we worked with them and made suggestions 
all the way. We didn’t make decisions for them, they made their own decisions 
especially the composition and make up of the NASCOM’ (Interview no. 3). 
Similarly, another participant positively described the participation of stakeholders as 
bottom-up versus a top-down management approach and made the following assertion: 
‘I think the main thing the URI brought was the approach you know, making 
sure there was a participatory approach, that really engaged the fishermen and 
civil society actors, along site the government and gave them a place at the 
decision-making table but not just gave them a place but we did a lot of 
activities with the fishermen like doing action research, doing studies on local 
knowledge, and then doing some scientific research and putting it all together 
with the local knowledge to understand what was known about the fishery’ 
(Interview no. 4) 
 
Stakeholders generally participated in the process, as a participant noted,: ‘… through a 
multi-stakeholder approach including fishermen, women fish processors and trader, 
Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Fisheries, etc’ (Interview no. 9). Indeed, most of the 
FIP decisions made had to go through all stakeholders for validation especially in terms of 
the sole fishery management plan as another participant mentioned: ‘So after 2 years, it 
already had resulted to sort of a sole management plan and Oyster plan, that was approved 
by all the stakeholders and that had a significant stuff in it like delegating use rights to co-
management entities’ (Interview no. 4). 
Although NASCOM (led the FIP process) was proactive in the FIP processes, the 
government through its related participating departments also had their own roles to play 
as per the agreed MOU guiding the FIP. However, in keeping with observations made by 
Allison & Horemans (2006), who have noted how governments are often very reluctant to 
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participate meaningfully in such hybrid processes, the Gambian government departments, 
although active in some stages as noted above, were relatively passive when present at FIP 
meetings as the following participant noted: 
‘the government just sat down and watched everything and did nothing. I mean 
we once met with the minister and secretary. They were just watching and did 
nothing; the president stays out which was good. The DoFISH just came and 
watch and learn’. (Interview no. 5) 
The follow up of various regulations by the government will definitely assist in the process 
as an industry participant posited. There is a need for the control of fishing boats and 
fishermen from Senegal as part of efforts to curb the current waves of uncontrolled 
overfishing in the Gambia. Also, the support of the local industry through feasible policies 
will go along way not only to benefit the industry but also Gambians through better tax 
returns amongst other relevant issues such as government staff proactiveness. The industry 
participant said: 
‘So even the factory is doing better then they will employ more people and more 
tax, get more fish. So, the government should really be serious and get involved 
in the management... So it is all about the mentality, sensitization and not look 
at the money…So it is all about the mentality and the people. So, the main focus 
is the people’s will’ (Interview no. 2). 
Despite such passivity in some regards, the government did contribute in areas where it had 
competency and capacity to offer. Indeed, they did most of their activities as agreed upon 
in the work plan as the following participant recounts: ‘… Supporting the communities in 
good fishing practice such as good fishing hygiene; creating the conducive environment for 
the communities, building ice plants and cool storage; providing weather forecast 
information to communities’ (interview no. 7). 
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5.2.4 Capacity Enhancement 
Among numerous challenges facing most FIPs in Africa, the lack of capacity and 
capabilities remains a major and crucial factor that limits progress for fisheries engaged 
within FIP-related activities. As noted by Andrew et al. (2007) capacity-building is 
necessary for fisheries  to improve in developing countries which are mostly small-scale, 
traditional or artisanal in nature. Most African fisheries currently depend to some extent on 
rudimentary techniques or technologies for fish exploitation and processing compared to 
large-scale and more industrialized fishing countries. As  the case with many other  
developing countries fisheries (See Hall et al., 2013; Bunce et al., 2008), high illiteracy 
levels also exist amongst the Gambian fishers. Many in the fishery have hardly had any 
formal education or training on how to carry out professional fishing (and this impacts their 
ability to participate effectively in fisheries evolving towards sustainability, especially 
given that such change processes tend to require technical knowledge.  
As articulated by one participant, the majority of stakeholders participating in the sole FIP, 
including those representing government departments, industry, local fishery associations, 
as well as the fishers themselves, all need some degree of training or formal education if 
they are to more effectively engage with the fishery improvement process: 
‘So DoFish is very weak and the other thing we made sure was the educational 
component like lets talk about leadership. What does leadership means, co-
management and the last thing was what knowledge do we have about the 
fishery and what’s happening.  Basically the only knowledge’s they had was 
local knowledge […] We then  took a 3 prong approach, we had to improve 
capacities of the people of the country…we were there for 5 years because we 
wanted it to continue and most of the staffs had poor knowledge.  The data 
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collectors had to create their own ways to get to the beaches and there was one 
computer and he was one guy there, who left’ (Interview no. 5). 
This participant statement clearly shows how almost all participants are experiencing a type 
of capacity gap. People need to be trained and time is needed to do this. The Ba Nafaa 
project took up to three years to build the people’s capacity, especially within the 
department of fisheries, to handle issues related to stock assessment and how to better 
structure and coordinate the co-managed system (CRC-URI, 2014). It also faced tight 
budget challenges. Despite these limitations, this URI-led project effectively strategized on 
how training could be done in a manner that trickled down to every participant. As the 
following interviewee mentioned: 
‘there where operating principles, like URI, will facilitate the participatory 
process and the fact that the capacity building should only be on the government 
site. But we have to make sure that all the actors down the chain from national 
levels down to the fishermen all need to benefit from the capacity building and 
the processes’ (Interview no. 4). 
With a training plan that cut across all the relevant participants, the FIP was able to move 
forward on important project components such as data collection, stock management, and 
governance or leadership development. Notwithstanding these efforts, the sustainability of 
these training efforts was an issue raised by one of the participants who made the following 
assertion: ‘… we really have to be careful of the needs and priorities like those in the fishery 
department and some junior staffs etc. So, the government must sign a letter saying they 
are going to be employed when they get back, so we are sure they are going back to assist 
to have more focus training from workshops and it has to be sustained over a long period 
of time’ (Interview no. 3). Such a situation and thinking always arise within many projects 
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in Africa, where people are trained and later abandon the position due to one or several 
reasons, thus creating more capacity needs that obstruct the smooth functioning of these 
improvement processes especially if the person had a very vital role in the process.  
The capacity needs for most FIP-related activities mostly focused on data collection, 
especially at landing sites, stock assessment, data collation, and data management., creating 
jobs either by local firms or government and the overall management and leadership skills 
of the stakeholders. A co-managed system of fisheries governance, as in the case of the 
Gambian FIP, needs significant training in areas related to data given the nature of the field. 
Another area of capacity development propriety relates to decision-making. Specifically, it 
is important that participants understand how to properly work collaboratively such that 
conflict can be avoided. As a participant said: 
‘But there is a lot to be done in terms of the institutions, the structures, and the 
capabilities and you have to build all that. We are willing to share power with 
the fishing industry and give them more respect in what they are doing, 
particularly in terms of decisions rather than government people trying to say 
the fishermen are uneducated, but the fishermen know a lot in what they do’ 
(Interview no. 3). 
This perspective supports the need for the proper capacity building if the FIP is to operate 
effectively. Participants also need a adequate understanding of the various institutions 
involved, the actors’ differing roles, and how decisions are being and will be made. For 
example, a researcher participant said: ‘we did some [research] capacity on how they can 
do a stock assessment which they weren’t doing before…’ (Interview no. 3). 
Another participant mentioned how learning from the experiences of neighboring countries 
could be of interest and importance. The participant said: ‘So, Gambia can still have support 
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from Senegal not only from those abroad through the transfer of technology from a 
neighbor. Another thing is fish stock and information management or statistics since they 
don’t do any research…at the level of the government’ (Interview no. 2). 
It is worth noting that investing in capacity building within the sole FIP process was seen 
as high priority. The various donor organizations and NGOs involved invested resources to 
help ensure participants had the abilities needed to ensure the sustainability of the project, 
especially when the funding stops. These capacity-building efforts were seen as 
investments in the future, and as a way of reducing project costs in the long run as noted 
by the following participant: 
‘So, it will be nice if the capacity is there to reduce the cost in the future through 
upfront investment in building the institutional structures and the human 
resources and capacities and that can carry out quite a bit’ (Interview no. 3). 
 
5.3 Challenges of the Gambian FIP  
The Gambian sole FIP, despite its accomplishments thus far, is still challenged with many 
issues. If such issues were addressed, better outcomes would likely result. Generally, low 
literacy rates and weak capacity infrastructures remain key human resources constraints 
that plague the development of these fisheries. As Wakamatsu & Wakamatsu (2007) noted, 
a proper understanding of the certification guidelines is very difficult for small-scale 
fisheries like those in the Gambia owing to lack of expertise. However, other challenges 
that seriously affect the smooth running of the FIP also exist. 
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First, there is inadequate work done by officials to integrate communities in the FIP. 
Fishing communities need to be properly informed and encouraged to participate in all 
aspects of such processes. Sensitizing community members for either  short or long-term 
involvement is also very important. Helping them to understand how they can influence the 
process to bring about fishery sustainability is critical. This attention to community 
participation was described as lacking by one of the participants in the Gambian FIP: 
‘… one is to have good sensitization on how to stop it and enforce the law. And 
then some bad practices like nets  bycatch. The main issue is the juvenile fishing 
and organize fishing space […] I say one drawback with URI, they spoke only 
with some leaders, not all, but they need to go deep, also NASCOM 80% of 
them are not fishers. So as of now, they don’t really involve fishers’ (Interview 
no. 1). 
Most importantly, the small-scale fishers who are the principal producers who are most 
affected by, or supposed beneficiaries of, improvements are generally simply represented 
by a few leaders. So, this lack of deep engagement is really a key issue as another 
participant emphasized again: ‘Lack of sensitization on good fishing practice to the 
communities and the use of the wrong fishing net and gears’ (Interview no. 7). 
Secondly, the whole process towards obtaining the MSC eco-label is very challenging for 
small-scale fisheries despite the level of improvements completed through MSC pre-
assessments and FIPs. Since 2007, the Gambian sole fishery went through multiple 
stakeholder involvement efforts. It has undergone two MSC pre-assessments with 
numerous financial investments yet have failed to meet the sustainability standards. The 
inability to meet the standard seems to have gone a long way to frustrate many of the 
participants involved, especially when they came so close in earlier efforts. Due to the 
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frustration related to not being able to achieve the MSC certification and label, participants 
in the FIP, including some donors, researchers and even industry representatives, appear to 
have lost some of their initial motivation for participation in the FIP. One of the participants 
made the following assertion to this: 
‘Yeah, it is challenging because the MSC standards are basically benchmark to 
the industrial fishery and Western nations-type capacity, so it’s very very 
challenging and you know for the Gambia the main challenges are that of  
meeting the data standards and stock assessment standards’ (Interview no. 4). 
In addition to frustration about failing to meet the MSC standard, there has also been some 
frustration related to funding and particularly on the declining funding for the FIP. Funding 
remains a major challenge for these fisheries. A lack of progress at the FIP level appears to 
discourage funders. When external funding keeps dropping frustrations arise and this can 
affect motivation and ultimately outcomes: 
‘So I think another challenge in this small-scale developing countries fisheries 
is not only the assessment expenses but also to get it and all the things you need 
to do. And if you don’t pass, all the improvements cost money too which can 
be more expensive than the assessment itself without donor support in all these 
initiatives. I think small-scale fisheries don’t really stand a chance to do all these 
and many countries too. The industry is quite diverse and they don’t have one 
strong association and financial resources or organizational capacity necessary 
to do this kind of things’ (Interview no.3). 
An additional challenge in the Gambian context relates to the inaccessibility of training 
institutions. The Gambia has just a handful of training centers. Aside from the University 
of the Gambia, there are no other training facilities. Many FIP participants had to receive 
training in countries outside of the Gambia. Given the associated cost of such training, only 
some people could receive the training they needed. This was expensive. The few lucky 
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ones who did get trained still do not have the capacity to adequately handle all the activities 
or tasks coming to them. This human resource capacity gap was noted by several 
participants, with a representative quote below: 
‘Okay what I know, the first thing is about the human resource, especially for 
the Gambia. Not enough expertise in the fishery by those in the fisheries 
department, some countries have schools for training, but the Gambia doesn’t. 
Very few experts, which at times they are not there when you need them 
especially when they are on leave. But I know the project trains people in the 
US and some training, but you know you even those trained are not having any 
base in fishery so is not relevant’ (Interview no 2). 
The unavailability of experts capable of handling stock assessment or data collection, 
especially at critical periods, was a major limitation for the FIP in the Gambia. Thus, the 
FIP project’s objective to conduct a scientific assessment of the fishery’s sustainability 
failed as a result of poor data availability. The challenges of having to work with poor 
surveillance systems and with a lack of fishery patrol boats were additional limitations. To 
help address capacity challenges, NASCOM, as the principal FIP lead, provided volunteer 
staff, although the fact that they were temporary volunteers seems to have impacted their 
commitment to the tasks allotted to them. Although volunteer and temporary staff brought 
goodwill to their efforts, goodwill was not enough to bring about the desired outcomes as 
noted below: 
‘The other thing I will like to say is what most outsiders don’t realise about an 
organization like NASCOM.  Like any NGO, who has  permanent staffs that 
are salaried, NASCOM staffs basically are volunteering.  So, it is not like they 
are getting salaries to work full time in their capacity as NASCOM. So, for me, 
it is very understandable [that] they are not functioning like NGO with 5 or 
more staffs that have salaries’ (Interview no. 4). 
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In addition to the volunteer staff limitations at NASCOM, many participants also noted 
how NASCOM only functions when researchers from URI were present. Their presence at 
meetings was not constant, as was the case with government representatives. Over time 
attendance at meetings more generally dropped. This caused lapses in proper follow-on 
planned activities as noted below:  
‘… Next is follow up of the project. As it starts many people are interested and 
soon they stop. Even if you call a meeting people don’t come compared to when 
the project began […] you know everyone has his own responsibility and 
diverse role. We only see NASCOM when URI came. So, we think the 
interaction is different, NASCOM should not only wait on URI for the meeting. 
So normally we should have our own meeting without URI and not only wait 
on when URI come’ (Interview no. 2). 
Another key challenge experienced relates to the political will and involvement of 
government in the whole process. As noted, the lack of available expertise and financial 
resources from government limited success. Failures in meeting the MSC standard has been 
attributed to government lapses in setting up good stock assessment systems and 
developing good legislation that would regulate fishing zones and ensure effectively the 
enforcement of legislation as noted below: ‘In my sight, I don’t know exactly but I think 
we [are] not getting enough from the fishery department, and also we don’t have enough 
results to meet the MSC standard for the label. They don’t give because we don’t have 
result’ (Interview no. 2).  
The Gambian Sole FIP is an interesting case amongst the FIPs in developing countries and 
Africa in particular. Local fishery associations are principal drivers of improvement 
initiatives and complimented with support from international agencies and NGOs. Fishers 
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participation and that of the local government in the FIP process is limited but recognizable. 
Through the co-management structure for the fishery, particularly through the role of 
NASCOM, the government has their position in the governance of the fishery, though many 
of the support and improvement initiatives are coordinated by the participating actors. The 
fishery has received several international supports from NGOs, seafood industry giants and 
the MSC itself and is currently working to meet certification standards and one day achieve 
the MSC eco-label. The Gambia sole fishery FIP thus is characterized by a mix of 
international and local actors and interests, enabled in particular by relatively well-
organized local interests and a co-management structure (NASCOM). The new 
environmental governance intervention, FIP, thus was made possible by an already existing 
social and institutional context conducive to facilitating the largely externally-driven 
governance interventions.    
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
6.1 Conclusions 
Over recent decades, there has been a trend to enhance the sustainable and efficient 
management of wild-caught fisheries globally while still encouraging its competitiveness 
at the international scale. This has been achieved to some extent through pressures and 
supports from promoters of various eco-certification schemes, with the MSC blue-ecolabel 
as the most well-recognized certification standard-setter. But owing to the numerous 
drawbacks of the MSC (such as the  certification costs, and very difficult assessment criteria 
amongst others), and through multi-stakeholder consultations and agreements, FIPs were 
introduced in late 2010 under the umbrella of the Conservation Alliance for Seafood 
Solutions (CASS). These FIPs encourage a multi-stakeholder approach as a means to 
improve the management of fisheries as they move towards sustainability and where 
possible, they can also seek to raise their standards in preparation for full assessments for 
MSC certification. 
When effective, FIPs create  changes in the governance systems of fisheries, especially 
when there is the involvement of multiple actors and agents within the FIP processes. 
Conceptualizing the case of African FIPs, this thesis draws its motivation from an interest 
in understanding the current shift of fishery governance approaches from a more state-
centric system to a transnational and often non-state driven multi-stakeholder approach.  
The popularity of FIPs as a governance approach is based on the various expected benefits 
a fishery might gain from the process, especially within the international market. Thus, this 
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simple fact alone is a huge motivating factor for most of the actors participating in this 
improvement approach. 
The plethora of actors - such as state authorities, industries, fishers and numerous private 
authorities and NGOs - within FIPs processes in Africa has been the principal point of 
attention for this thesis, including an analysis of the various motivations of the stakeholders, 
their commitments (especially financial resources), their interactions and collaborative 
behaviour in facilitating improvements for these fisheries. Through in-depth analysis as 
discussed in chapter 4 and 5, the thesis identified various motivations for participation, 
including the drive for proper fish stock conservation, sustainability and access of these 
fisheries to the international market. Relatedly, almost all African FIPs are dependent on 
external funding sources from donor organizations and NGOs, who are in most cases 
leading these improvement initiatives. Governments are often weak and seldom financially 
involved in such FIP processes. With such an internationally led approach for most FIPs in 
Africa, we are tempted to question the type of interaction that does exist between these 
actors, especially with histories of external colonialism and exploitation on the continent. 
But as the discussion outlines, a collaborative and amicable interaction between most actors 
involved with fishery decision-making and policy formulation processes is possible 
through FIPs. There is, to some extent, a high degree of stakeholder involvement, especially 
during the development of FIP work plans. The fishers and their communities on their part 
though are challenged in participation, partly due to low literacy rates but also because of 
a lack of expertise and infrastructure. Despite these limitations, some fishers’ 
representatives become very active in their FIP as was the case of the Gambian Sole fishery. 
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The issue of sensitization of these FIP initiatives amongst fishers, communities and even 
the governments remain a problem for most of these FIPs. The FIP guidelines, as a 
participant mentioned, are very technical and not written in plain language. Thus, 
interacting and dealing with small-scale fishers who have very little or no formal education 
always challenged the FIP. In some cases, FIPs did not involve the actual fishers but just a 
few educated elites of the region. The lack of inclusion of non-fishing/fishery experts in 
some FIP processes definitely created an imbalance in the type of policies or decisions that 
were taken and the actual challenges that were addressed. Also, the enthusiasm of these 
participants was observed to decline over time from when the FIP was actually launched to 
its implementation phases, especially when the funders left the process or terminated their 
funding contributions.  
Governments were generally proactive in developing legislation and policies supportive of 
improvements, but the enforcement mechanisms for these legislations are very porous and 
weak, thus making it a big issue for these fisheries. Governments are in most cases limited 
in expertise or infrastructure to effectively manage their fisheries, which hinders greatly the 
consolidation of improvement initiatives made possible through FIPs. In the Gambian case, 
the financial commitment from the government was observed to be very minimal, and this 
appears to have influenced the participation of government representatives in the overall 
FIP process. As earlier mentioned, in the African context, the lack of infrastructure and 
capabilities of these government departments often resulted in a lot of challenges with FIP 
processes, especially in terms of stock assessment and the availability of relevant data for 
the FIP process. This provides a lot of drawbacks to the smooth functioning of such FIP 
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processes, especially in terms of capacity building and training efforts which can take most 
projects up to 3 years to effectively implement.  
External partners and NGOs are very active participants in the region, leading or supporting 
most of these FIPs. Their purview over interactions within the process is seemingly 
transparent and goal oriented (that is improving the fishery to an acceptable level of 
sustainability) while including fishery stakeholders in the process. Many of these external 
partners involve the fishing community from the very onset so as to ensure project leaders 
understand community needs and how to better approach improvements for the fishery. 
Their participation in policy formulation and work plan development processes is relatively 
open and relevant actors are given a place at the decision-making table. They coordinate 
workshops and training sessions for the people. They address participation challenges such 
as those experienced in Mozambique and Tanzania where language barriers limited the 
participants from becoming fully involved with the FIP. These external partners have also 
been very active in lobbying other organizations to support fisheries, especially when it 
comes to the cost of their pre-assessments and other improvement initiatives. 
Through lobbying from NGOs and the MSC, international seafood industry actors, 
particularly buyers, have been supporting FIPs in Africa, especially fisheries with high 
market value. They help promote and advertise the fishery to the international market, thus 
improving its competitiveness globally. Their support has included funding pre-
assessments and improvement initiatives that promote sustainability of the fishery. Of 
course, their aim for this support is to help the fishery meet standards set by the MSC for it 
to possibly get the eco-label and garner the benefits attached to it. The local industries are 
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equally very supportive within these FIP initiatives by providing human resources or data 
collection and making available fish stock data within their reach to assist the scientific and 
technological aspects of the fishery improvements.  
Conclusively, FIPs in Africa are mostly externally-led by various NGOs and international 
partners who all have the common interest of ensuring the sustainability of these fisheries. 
Governments are not as willing or able to commit financially to these projects, though they 
are present in most of the decision-making processes of the FIP through their various 
government departments. The fishers are challenged with low education levels that affect 
their full participation and understanding of the FIP guidelines. Above all, there are many 
ways to improve these fisheries through stakeholders involvement,  participation, and 
collaboration.  
6.2 Recommendations 
Whilst the sustainability of wild-caught fisheries remains a very important challenge for 
future generations and for conservation purposes, FIPs are a new global trend for the 
governance and management of fisheries that encourage stakeholders’ participation for 
sustainability. The need to promote and support the competitiveness of African fisheries in 
the international market has been on major policy agendas for many years and been 
supported by many public and private actors and agents. As carefully outlined above, public 
and private, state and non-state actors play specific key roles in these FIPs. 
The thesis also identified notable challenges in the emergence and development of FIPs, 
however. Firstly, there is a great need for improvements and advancements to be done in 
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the region with respect to capacities and capabilities. To be sure, there are existing 
institutions and infrastructures that support capacity building in the area. The training and 
retainment of skilled expertise in fish stock data collections, stock assessments and the 
surveillance/monitoring of fishing areas with patrol boats are all relevant needs. Many 
people who have been trained have left their position and these trends have been a big issue 
for most of the FIPs. Thus, looking at better alternatives that prevent such human resource 
turnover will go a long way in reducing some capacity issues. Most donor-sponsored 
programs spend many years within their time frame just to ensure they meet the needs of 
the FIP. 
Secondly, governments need to get fully involved with and participate in these 
improvement initiatives, especially in terms of financial contributions and commitments. 
Dependence on external funding raises questions about the level of government 
commitment to the projects. A co-financed system where every participating stakeholder 
contributes something is an option to consider. Also, the proper follow-up and execution 
of existing legislation are often very weak or porous. Violations of laws are rampant as the 
government in most cases lacks the resources to properly enforce these laws within 
communities, especially those further away from the central government. But as the case 
of the Gambia illustrates, co-management structures are the best option where community 
representatives assist in the implementation of these laws and policies at the local level, 
though its weakness lies in the fact that it is very difficult for a leader who has lived within 
a community to punish his/her own community members. Overall, there is a need for the 
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proper consolidation of the role of government in these FIP processes, including financial 
commitments. 
Furthermore, the current focus of local industries could be modified not just to target 
foreign markets but also to encourage local consumption and marketing of the fish and 
related fish products. Such a change will help curb the fluctuating market price effects 
created by international market shocks. As well, the revitalization of the sector to a more 
lucrative and touristic arena will help attract more tourists to the area, and tourists will 
potentially be ready to pay extra for the fish products straight from the source and these can 
equate to the premiums envisaged from having the eco-label. Investing in such local 
industries will not only boost the economy of these fishing communities and the country 
but also create wealth and jobs for the people, thus reducing poverty and unemployment of 
the people to some levels. With such a vibrant local industry, there will be more investments 
in the FIP-related activities and will help reduce the overdependency nature of the fisheries 
to external funding sources. Communities will be more willing and engaged in any 
initiatives that seek to make their fisheries sustainable since they are seeing the direct 
benefit of their involvement and the value of their fisheries. 
To accentuate the need for better community participation through a very industrious 
fishery sector, actors and agents could prioritize not only the direct fishery improvement 
initiatives through science, technology and management infrastructures but also through 
investments and efforts that directly improve the livelihood of the people. This could make 
them more interested in the FIP initiatives and provide evidence to attract the people needed 
to participate in these necessary processes. Also, the establishment of proper channels 
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through which fishers (small-scale), can be properly represented within the work plan 
development and policy formulation processes of a FIP is extremely important. Fishers 
have a very important role in directing the FIP for more effective improvements owing to 
their life experiences in the sea and harvesting fish for their livelihood.   
6.3 Future Research 
This research has explored and examined the governance and involvement of multiple 
actors within FIPs in Africa. Despite such an in-depth analysis of these FIPs in the region, 
there exists several directions and emerging trends for further research related to FIPs in 
the region. The research focused on just one case study (the Gambian Sole Fishery), 
whereas a comparative case analysis between several FIPs could better reveal patterns of 
similarities and differences within and across multiple African FIPs. The single case study 
alone cannot fully represent the actual situation for African FIPs, given the great diversity 
amongst FIPs. There is also a need for research to effectively categorize and examine the 
different fisheries and their current management structures. Also, because this research had 
very little involvement on the part of government officials, as few were willing to 
participate in the research, additional research focused on the participation of government 
representatives in FIP processes is required. 
Furthermore, due to the small-scale nature of these fisheries, there is a need for additional 
community-based research initiatives that critically explore community understandings, 
impressions, motivations, challenges and needs related to how and why they do and do not 
participate in FIP activities. Similarly, there is a need for research to enhance understanding 
of the benefits or lack thereof of these FIP initiatives for the fishers and community 
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members. Though the sustainability of the fishery is promoted as a primary benefit for their 
engagement, there is a need for further research on the exact benefits small-scale fishers 
receive or do not receive if a fishery finally achieves MSC certification and the ecolabel. 
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